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Mitchell v. Helms: Giving the
Cleveland School Voucher
Program a Fighting Chance
He only says, "Good fences make good neighbors."
Spring is the mischief in me, and I wonder
If I could put a notion in his head:
"Why do they make good neighbors? Isn't it
Where there are cows? But here there are no cows.
Before I built a wall I'd ask to know
What I was walling in or walling out,
And to whom I was like to give offense.
Something there is that doesn't love a wall,
That wants it down."
- Robert Frost, Mending Wall'
I.

INTRODUCTION

In 1995, in response to an educational crisis in Cleveland's public
schools, the Ohio State legislature enacted a scholarship program which
provided money in the form of "vouchers" to students within the local
school district This scholarship enabled students to choose which among
the program's "alternative schools" they wished to attend.' The majority of
the schools participating in the program were private and "churchaffiliated."' Thus, most of the children enrolled in the Cleveland Voucher
Program received money to attend a private, sectarian school

1. ROBERT FROST, THE POETRY OF ROBERT FROST 33-34 (Edward Connery Lathem ed., Henry
Holt and Co. 1979).
2. Simmons-Harris v. Zelman, 72 F. Supp. 2d 834, 836 (N.D. Ohio 1999), afrd, 234 F.3d 945
(6th Cir. 2000). The 1995 program was struck down by the Ohio Supreme Court in May of 1999 as
being in violation of the Ohio Constitution. However, it was "re-enacted in all pertinent respects by
the Ohio Legislature" in June of 1999. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 836-37.
5. Id.
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Does the Cleveland School Voucher Program violate the Establishment
Clause of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution?

The

Establishment Clause provides, "Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion.. . ," Interpreting the meaning of this Clause
when it comes to governmental aid to religious schools has proved one of

the most controversial and challenging tasks in judicial history.8
In December of 1999, the District Court for the Northern District of
Ohio held that the Cleveland Voucher Program violated the Establishment
Clause, and permanently enjoined the State of Ohio from administering the

program One year later, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the decision of the
District Court, but in hotly debated majority and dissenting opinions, which
evidenced the current uncertainty of Establishment Clause precedent when
applied to school vouchers.'" Cleveland Voucher Program supporters,
including President George W. Bush, have petitioned the Supreme Court to
hear the case."
The judicial battle over the Cleveland Program came in the wake of a
decision by the Wisconsin Supreme Court to uphold a similar "parental
choice" program implemented in Milwaukee, and the Supreme Court of the

6. See U.S. CONST. amend. I.
7. Id.
8. See Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 807 (2000) ("In the over 50 years since Everson we
have consistently struggled to apply these simple words in the context of governmental aid to
religious schools."); see also Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 678 (1971) ("[C]andor compels the
acknowledgment that we can only dimly perceive the boundaries of permissible government activity
in this sensitive area of constitutional adjudication.").
9. Simmons-Harris v. Zelman, 72 F. Supp. 2d at 865.
10. See Simmons-Harris v. Zelman, 234 F.3d 945, 948 (6th Cir. 2000), reh'g and suggestionfor
reh'g en banc denied, (Feb. 28, 2001). Circuit Judge Clay, writing for the majority, concluded:
The effect of the voucher program is in direct contravention to [the] Supreme Court
cases which mandate that the state aid be neutrally available to all students who qualify,
that the parents receiving the state aid have:the option of applying the funds to secular
organizations or causes as well as to religious institutions, and that the state aid does not
provide an incentive to choose a religious institution over a secular institution.
Id. at 961. In contrast, dissenting judge Ryan concluded that "a reading of the Supreme Court's
Establishment Clause cases decided since 1973 makes it unmistakably clear that the voucher
program passes constitutional muster." Id. at 963 (Ryan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
11. See Pet. for Cert. Filed, 70 U.S.L.W. 3035 (May 23, 2001) (No. 00-1751); Pet. for Cert.
Filed, 69 U.S.L.W. 3763 (May 25, 2001) (No. 00-1777); Pet. for Cert. Filed, 69 U.S.L.W. 3764
(May 25, 2001) (No. 00-1779); see also Linda Greenhouse, White House Seeks Ruling on Vouchers,
DAYT. D. NEWS, July 8, 2001, at 15A
("In a brief filed late last month in support of Ohio's petition, Theodore B. Olson, who
was confirmed as the new solicitor general in May, said that it was 'in the nation's
interest' for the court to take up the case. Olson said policy-makers needed to 'know,
without further delay, whether such programs are a constitutionally permissible option for
expanding education opportunity for children enrolled in failing public schools across
America, or whether other solutions must be sought for this critical national problem.");
Karen Gullo, Bush Urges High Court on Vouchers, AP ONLINE, June 23, 2001 ("By filing an
uninvited brief to the nation's top court, the Bush administration is signaling its intention to press the
case for programs that allow tax dollars to be used to pay student tuition at religious schools.").
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United States decision to allow it to stand.12 As more and more states
propose and enact similar voucher programs, the question intensifies as to
their constitutionality, and how and when the Supreme Court will ultimately
decide the issue. 3

This past term, however, the Supreme Court in Mitchell v. Helms may
have given some indication of its leanings when it held that Chapter 2 of the
Education Consolidation and Improvement Act, which provided government
aid in materials and equipment to public and private schools in Jefferson
Parish, Louisiana, did not violate the Establishment Clause. 4 In a plurality
opinion, the Court found that there is "no basis for concluding that Jefferson
Parish's Chapter 2 program 'has the effect of advancing religion"' because
the aid itself is neutral, eligibility for aid is determined by neutral factors,
and allocation of the aid is based on the private choices of the parents of
schoolchildren.' 5 Is Mitchell v. Helms merely the latest case in the long line

of Supreme Court decisions struggling to give coherent meaning to the
Establishment Clause, or did it signal a significant breakthrough in the
Court's analysis of these issues? 6

12. See Jackson v. Benson, 578 N.W. 2d 602, 632 (Wis. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 997
(1998); see also Robert L. McFarland, Comment, The Milwaukee Parental Choice Program: A
ConstitutionalVictory for School Choice, 27 PEPP. L. REV. 107 (1999); Christopher A. Hoffman,
Note, The Future of School Vouchers for Religious Academies After Jackson v. Benson, 43 ST.
Louis U. L.J. 1083 (1999).
13. See Jaime Steven Kilberg, Note, Neutraland IndirectAid: Designing a ConstitutionalSchool
Voucher Program Under the Supreme Court's Accommodationist Jurisprudence,88 GEO. L.J. 739,
739 & n.3 (2000) (noting that "[s]everal states have active legislation pending: Alaska, California,
Colorado, Delaware, Georgia, Hawaii, Kansas, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri,
Nebraska, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Virginia, and Washington"); see also
Frank R. Kremerer, The Constitutionalityof School Vouchers, 101 EDUC. L. REP. 17, 17 (1995)
(stating that public policymakers are increasingly looking towards improving schools through
voucher programs); Danielle Jess Latham, Note, Wall of Separation or Path to Interaction: The
Uncertain Constitutional Future of School Vouchers in Light of Inconsistent Developments in
Judicial Neutrality Between Church and State, 48 DRAKE L. REV. 403, 405 (2000) (noting that
vouchers "continue to spark heated legal and political controversy in this country"); Kilberg, supra
at 770 ("The school voucher issue is perhaps one of the most publicly debated, national
constitutional issues [that the] U.S. Supreme Court has consistently refused to address."); Kim K.
Metcalf & Polly A. Tait, Free Market Policies and Public Education: What is the Cost of Choice, 81
PHI DELTA KAPPAN 65 (1999) ("Educational choice will continue to be the most contentious issue in
U.S. education for the foreseeable future.").
14. 530 U.S. 793, 808 (2000).
15. Id. at 829.
16. For one opinion and analysis of the question, see Julie F. Mead & Julie K. Underwood,
Lemon Distilled with Four Votes for Vouchers: An Examination of Mitchell v. Helms and its
Implications, 149 ED. LAW REP. 639 (Feb. 15, 2001) ("That Mitchell will ultimately shine brightly in
the constellation of Establishment Clause jurisprudence is doubtful, given the deep divisions
between the plurality and concurring opinions. But... the multiple opinions filed in relation to its
dispute do shed light on this evolving and interesting facet of the application of constitutional law to
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From this nation's beginnings, religion and education have, and
continue to be, intrinsic features of American life.'7 Indeed, the Supreme
Court has on numerous occasions reaffirmed this fact. In 1952, Justice
Douglas wrote:
We are a religious people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme
Being. We guarantee the freedom to worship as one chooses. We
make room for as wide a variety of beliefs and creeds as the
spiritual needs of man deem necessary. We sponsor an attitude on
the part of government that shows no partiality to any one group
and that lets each flourish according to the zeal of its adherents and
the appeal of its dogma. When the state encourages religious
instruction or cooperates with religious authorities by adjusting the
schedule of public events to sectarian needs, it follows the best of
our traditions. For it then respects the religious nature of our people
and accommodates the public service to their spiritual needs. To
hold that it may not would be to find in the Constitution a
requirement that the government show a callous indifference to
religious groups. That would be preferring those who believe in no
religion over those who do believe."
Two years later, in the landmark opinion Brown v. Board of Education,

Chief Justice Warren declared:
[E]ducation is perhaps the most important function of state and
local governments. Compulsory school attendance laws and the
great expenditures for education both demonstrate our recognition
of the importance of education to our democratic society. It is
required in the performance of our most basic public
responsibilities, even service in the armed forces. It is the very
foundation of good citizenship. Today it is a principal instrument in
awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing him for later
professional training, and in helping him to adjust normally to his
environment. In these days, it is doubtful that any child may
reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the
opportunity of an education. Such an opportunity, where the state

elementary and secondary education.").
17. See McFarland, supra note 12, at 109 ("Religious freedom is central to human liberty."); see
also Christian W. Johnston, Agostini v. Felton: Redefining the Establishment of Religion Through A
Modification of the Lemon Test, 26 PEPP. L. REV. 407, 407 (1999) ("Even though there is no
fundamental right to an education, public policy strongly favors education.") (footnote omitted);
Hoffman, supra note 12, at 1086 ("Education is central both to democracy and the economy of this
nation.").
18. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313-14 (1952).
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has undertaken to provide it, is a right which must be made
available to all on equal terms.' 9

Almost fifty years later, strikingly similar arguments are made in favor of
school vouchers. 20
This Comment argues that school voucher programs, and specifically

the program implemented in Cleveland, are constitutional under the
Establishment Clause as it was historically fashioned and interpreted,' and

especially in light of the Supreme Court's most recent addition to
Establishment Clause jurisprudence in Mitchell v. Helms.22 History reveals
19. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
20. See JOSEPH P. V1TERIrTI, CHOOSING EQUALITY: SCHOOL CHOICE, THE CONSTITUTION,
CIVIL SOCIETY 19 (1999). Viterittiexplains:
[Elducational inequality is a corrosive correlate to political inequality. If we are
committed to bolstering the health of American democracy, it is essential to replenish an
interest in civic life, and it is imperative to find ways for involving those who are
disaffected. But we must start by providing all citizens with a decent education.
Religious institutions can be instrumental on all of these counts.

AND

Id.; see also TERRY M. MOE, SCHOOLS, VOUCHERS, AND THE AMERICAN PUBLIC 15 (2001). Moe

argues:
School vouchers might seem a natural for American society. Our culture has long been
marked by widely shared beliefs in personal freedom, markets, and limited government,
and someone who didn't know anything about the history of American education might
expect to find these cultural values embodied in the nation's school system. A truly
American system of education, it might seem, would give parents a maximum of choice.
It would keep government control of the schools to a minimum. It would extend a
prominent role to private schools. It would encourage competition among schools. And
to make all these things possible, it would provide parents with vouchers.
Id.

21. See Michael W. McConnell, State Action and the Supreme Court'sEmerging Consensus on
the Line Between Establishmentand Private Religious Expression, 28 PEPP. L. REV. 68 1, 685 (2001)
("The Mitchell litigation perfectly illustrates the great changes in the Establishment Clause doctrine
over the last fifty years. Had the constitutionality of the program .been decided thirty years ago,
when it was first enacted, it probably would have been upheld."); see also Joseph P. Viteritti,
Blaine's Wake: School Choice, the FirstAmendment, and State ConstitutionalLaw, 21 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 657, 659-64 (1998) (noting that:
[T]he history of First Amendment jurisprudence in America is filled with irony and
paradox. The very idea of constitutionalism in Western political thought was inspired by
determination to set limits upon government by identifying provinces of individual
conduct beyond the scope of state interference, thus imposing constraints upon public
authority rather than upon the citizenry. Our convoluted reasoning regarding the First
Amendment has evolved in such a way that the courts have not only imposed unusual
restrictions on individual prerogatives, but they have done so in the name of
constitutionalism and freedom. In no area of legal argument is this confusion more
apparent than the debate over school choice.);
McFarland, supra note 12, at 109-10 ("The history of education in the United States... indicates an
early understanding of the Establishment Clause that did not require separation of state funds from
religious schools.").
22. 530 U.S. 793 (2000), reh'g denied, 530 U.S. 1296 (2000).
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that strict separation of church and state was not the intent of the framers,3
nor has it been the goal of modem jurists." Therefore, "voucher programs
involving religious institutions should not be written off as inherently
unconstitutional. 25
Part II of this Comment discusses the history and policy behind the
school voucher movement, and looks closely at the two most notable
modem examples, the Cleveland and Milwaukee programs.
Part III
examines the First Amendment's Establishment Clause in depth; analyzing
its origins, development, and most notably the Supreme Court's curious and
rather convoluted treatment of the Clause throughout history. Part IV
introduces Mitchell v. Helms and each of its three opinions: the plurality
written by Justice Thomas, the concurring opinion by Justice O'Connor, and
the dissent by Justice Souter. Part V applies the framework in Mitchell v.
Helms to the Cleveland Program, reasoning toward the conclusion that it
does not violate the Establishment Clause. Part VI concludes the Comment,
and offers a proscription for future school voucher jurisprudence and debate.

II. SCHOOL VOUCHERS

A. Origins:
Vouchers were first proposed in 1955 by economist and Nobel laureate
Milton Friedman.26 In 1979, Friedman and his wife, Rose, published Free to
Choose: A Personal Statement, which fully explained their argument for
school vouchers." Friedman argues that increasing government control over
education has resulted in the gradual decline of America's schools.
He

23. See ROBERT L. CORD, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE: HISTORICAL FACT AND
CURRENT FICTION 15 (1982); VITERITI, supra note 20, at 117-29; see also discussion infra Part
III.B.
24. See Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 312 (1952) (stating that the First Amendment "does not
say that in every and all respects there shall be a separation of Church and State .... Otherwise the
state and religion would be aliens to each other-hostile, suspicious, and even unfriendly."); Lemon
v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 614 (1971) ("Our prior holdings do not call for total separation between
church and state; total separation is not possible in an absolute sense. Some relationship between
government and religious organizations is inevitable.").
25. McFarland, supra note 12, at 109.
26. See Milton Friedman, The Role of Government in Education, in ECONOMICS AND THE
PUBLIC INTEREST (Robert A. Solo ed., 1955). Forty-five years later, Friedman is still advocating for
vouchers. See, e.g., Milton Friedman, How Can We Fix Our Public Schools? By Making Them
Private, in 2 HOOVER DIGEST 8, 9 (Peter Robinson ed., 2001), ("The most feasible way to bring
about a gradual yet substantial transfer from government to private enterprise is to enact in each state
a voucher system that enables parents to choose freely the schools their children attend.").
27. See MILTON & ROSE FRIEDMAN, FREE TO CHOOSE: A PERSONAL STATEMENT 150-88 (2d ed.
1990).
28. Id. at 151-52. Friedman continues:
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explains that the American school system was initially private and locally
run.29

However, in the 1840s, Horace Mann, the first secretary of the

Massachusetts State Board of Education, lead a campaign to replace the
private school system with a system of "free schools" paid for indirectly by
parents through taxes.3" According to Friedman, this movement reflected to
a minor extent the emerging socialist distrust of the free market system, but

mostly, "it simply reflected the importance that was attached by the
community to the ideal of equality of opportunity." 3'
Since the mid-nineteenth century, most children in the United States
have attended government schools." Friedman notes that citizens had every
reason to be proud of the "American" public school system.3 However, the
initial success of the system was due largely to local control.'

Friedman

explains:
The most important factor determining how the system operated
was its decentralized political structure. The U.S. Constitution
narrowly limited the powers of the federal government, so that it
played no significant role. The States mostly left control of schools
to the local community, the town, the small city, or a subdivision of
a large city. Close monitoring of the political authorities running
the school system by parents was a partial substitute for competition

For schooling, this sickness has taken the form of denying many parents control over the
kind of schooling their children receive either directly, through choosing and paying for
the schools their children attend, or indirectly, through local political activity. Power has
instead gravitated to professional educators. The sickness has been aggravated by
increasing centralization and bureaucratization of schools, especially in the big cities.
Id.
29. Id. at 152.
30. Id. at 153. Mann argued that "education was so important that government had a duty to
provide education to every child, that schools should be secular and include children of all religious,
social, and ethnic backgrounds, and that universal, free schooling would enable children to overcome
the handicaps of the poverty of their parents." Id.
31. Id. at 154.
32. Id. at 153.
33. Id. at 150-51. Friedman explains:
We have always been proud, and with good reason, of the widespread availability of
schooling to all and the role that public schooling has played in fostering the assimilation
of newcomers into our society, preventing fragmentation and divisiveness, and enabling
people from different cultural and religious backgrounds to live together in harmony.
Id.
34. Id.

349

and assured that any widely shared desires of parents were
implemented."

The era of governmental reform following the Great Depression changed
this structure.36 "Power shifted rapidly from the local community to broader
entities-the city, the county, the state, and more recently, the federal

government....

[P]rofessional educators have taken over, [and] control by

parents has weakened."" This bureaucratization and centralization has
fostered a system in which costs have increased and quality has decreased; a

system which has ultimately failed to serve the consumers, the parent and
child.38 Moreover, under the current system, the upper income classes have
retained their freedom to choose where to send their children to school, but

the lower classes have not.39 Friedman concludes that all parents must be
given more control over their children's schooling.'
One method by which Friedman proposes to return choice and control
back to parents is the voucher." He outlines the basic voucher theory as
follows:

35. Id. at 154-55.
36. Id. ("After the depression, when the public joined the intellectuals in an unbridled faith in the
virtues of government, and especially of central government, the decline of the one-room school and
the local school board became a rout.").
37. Id.
38. Id. at 155-57. Friedman argues that the Theory of Bureaucratic Displacement applies to the
public school system and explains its declining results. He quotes Dr. Max Gammon, the developer
of the theory, who noted, "[Ijn 'a bureaucratic system ... increase in expenditure will be matched
by fall in production.... Such systems will act rather like "black holes" in the economic universe,
simultaneously sucking in resources, and shrinking in terms of "emitted" production."' Id. at 155.
39. Id. at 157-58. Friedman laments:
The tragedy, and irony, is that a system dedicated to enabling all children to acquire a
common language and the values of U.S. citizenship, to giving all children equal
educational opportunity, should in practice exacerbate the stratification of society and
provide highly unequal educational opportunity. Expenditures on schooling per pupil are
often as high in the inner cities as in even the wealthy suburbs, but the quality of
schooling is vastly lower. In the suburbs almost all of the money goes for education; in
the inner cities much of it must go to preserving discipline, preventing vandalism, or
repairing its effects. The atmosphere in some inner city schools is more like that of a
prison than of a place of learning. The parents in the suburbs are getting far more value
for their tax dollars than the parents in the inner cities.
Id. at 158.
40. Id. at 160. Contrary to many social reformers, Friedman believes that "[plarents generally
have both greater interest in their children's schooling and more intimate knowledge of their
capabilities and needs than anyone else." Id.; see also Metcalf & Tait, supra note 13 (noting that:
Even scholars of education cannot agree about what is "good" education or "desirable"
educational practice ... [and] until or unless a consensus is reached among all the
stakeholders in children's education, it is unfair and patronizing to suggest that parents
and families are generally less entitled or less equipped than others to make these
determinations for themselves and for their children.).
41. FRIEDMAN, supra note 27, at 160.
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Suppose your child attends a public elementary or secondary
school. On the average, countrywide, it cost the taxpayer-you and
me-about $2,000 per year in 1978 for every child enrolled. If you
withdraw your child from a public school and send him to a private
school, you save taxpayers about $2,000 per year-but you get no
part of that saving except as it is passed on to all taxpayers, in which
case it would amount to at most a few cents off your tax bill. You
have to pay private tuition in addition to taxes-a strong incentive to
keep your child in a public school.
Suppose, however, the government said to you: "If you relieve
us of the expense of schooling your child, you will be given a
voucher, a piece of paper redeemable for a designated sum of
money, if, and only if, it is used to pay the cost of schooling your
child at an approved school." The sum of money might be $2,000,
or it might be a lesser sum, say $1,500 or $1,000, in order to divide
the savings between you and the other taxpayers. But whether the
full amount or the lesser amount, it would remove at least a part of
the financial penalty that now limits the freedom of parents to
choose.42

The basic mechanism driving the voucher process is competition. 3
Friedman's proposed plan, in effect, employs the free market system to
improve failing inner-city schools."
B. America's EducationalCrisis

There is little doubt that educational problems in America have
increased dramatically since Milton Friedman first proposed his plan.
Moreover, the current crisis is most dramatically illustrated in the inner

42. Id. at 160-61.
43. Id. at 161 ("The public schools would then have to compete both with one another and with
private schools.").
44. In 2001, Friedman underscores that "[v]ouchers are not an end in themselves; they are a
means to make a transition from a government to a market system." Friedman, How Can We Fix
Our Public Schools? By Making Them Private,supra note 26, at 14; see also Metcalf & Tait, supra
note 13 (noting arguments that vouchers provide poor families opportunity for educational choice,
lead to greater competition, which leads to better effectiveness in education).
45. Friedman, How Can We Fix Our Public Schools? By Making Them Private, supra note 26,
at 10 ("The quality of schooling is far worse today than it was in 1955.").

cities. 6 In the past decade, while black and Hispanic college admission rates
decreased, the odds of becoming a victim of crime in school have
increased." According to the Institute for Justice's Clint Bolick, "poor and
minority inner-city students have no greater chance of graduating with basic
proficiency than of being a victim of crime in their schools."48 For example,

in the Cleveland public schools students "have a 1 in 14 chance of
graduating on time from high school at senior-level proficiency, and an
equivalent 1 in 14 chance each year of being a victim of crime in their
schools." 9 In Milwaukee, "only 48 percent of the students [in public
schools] graduate-a dropout rate of more than seven times the state-wide
average-and only 15 percent of children from families on public assistance
graduate."' Additionally, in the eleven Milwaukee public high schools "that
enroll more than three-fourths of the city's black students, the median gradepoint average is less than 1.5 on a four-point scale."5
Yet studies have shown that "students from poor socioeconomic
backgrounds do much better in private schools."52 Why is this the case?
According to Bolick, "lt]he key differences between effective and
ineffective schools are autonomy, parental involvement, and a sense of
mission." 3 Inner-city public school systems are characterized by massive
bureaucracies, little parental influence, and a lack of responsiveness to
parents because parents cannot exit the system." In contrast, inner-city and
suburban private schools "tend to have smaller bureaucracies and to be more
responsive to parental concerns" because parents have the ability to change
schools if they are dissatisfied.5

46. See Clint Bolick, Solving the Educational Crisis Through ParentalChoice, 11 STAN. L. &
POL'Y REV. 245, 245 (2000) (noting the "appalling failure of America's public school system to
deliver quality educational opportunities to a large number of black and Hispanic children in our
nation's inner cities."); Friedman, How Can We Fix Our Public Schools? By Making Them Private,
supra note 26, at 10 ("There is no respect in which inhabitants of a low-income neighborhood are so
disadvantaged as in the kind of schooling they can get for their children.").
47. See Bolick, supra note 46, at 246 ("Although black high school students were steadily
closing the achievement gap between blacks and whites in the 1980s, that gap has widened
substantially during the past decade.").
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. (citing study by Chicago economist Derek Neal who found that "although Catholic
schools produce negligible academic gains for suburban and white students, they strongly improve
educational outcomes for urban minority children.").
53. Id. (citing JOHN E. CHUBB & TERRY M. MOE, POLITICS, MARKETS, & AMERICA'S SCHOOLS
140 (1990)).
54. Id.
55. Id. at 246-47.
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C. Current School Voucher Programs

1. The Milwaukee Parental Choice Program
In 1990, Wisconsin's governor Tommy F. Thompson labeled the
Milwaukee public school system a failure, and urged the state legislature to
give low-income parents a way out.56 The Wisconsin legislature responded
by enacting the Milwaukee Parental Choice Program, the nation's first
school voucher program targeting inner-city, low-income families.57 The
initial program was limited in scope,58 providing up to $2,500 for private
school tuition to parents "whose family income did not exceed 175% of the
national poverty level."59 In addition, the program did not permit voucher
recipients to attend private sectarian schoolsi6 The program proved highly
successful, however, and in 1995 it was amended to provide financial
assistance to more children6' while allowing parents to direct voucher money
to any private or public school, including private religious schools. 2
Perhaps anticipating a constitutional attack, the state legislature specified in
its amendments that checks would no longer be sent directly to the
participating school, but rather made out in the name of the parents, and
"endorsed by the parents and the school of their choice., 63 In addition,
students using voucher payments to attend private sectarian schools were
given the option of "opting out" of any required religious activities of the
school. 6'
By the 1998-99 school year, the Milwaukee Parental Choice Program
enrolled six thousand students in eighty-six schools and provided vouchers

56. McFarland, supra note 12, at 117.
57. Bolick, supra note 46, at 247 ("[Tlhe program's implementation in the fall of 1990 set off an
education revolution. For the first time ever, the program 1) transferred control over public
education funds from bureaucrats to parents, and 2) forced the public schools to compete for lowincome youngsters and the resources they commanded.").
58. The original program, being highly experimental, limited the total number of Milwaukee
public school students eligible to 1.5%. McFarland, supra note 12, at 117.
59. Jason T. Vail, Comment, School Vouchers and the Establishment Clause: Is the First
Amendment a Barrierto Improving Education for Low-Income Children?, 35 GONZ. L. REV. 187,
205 (2000).
60. Id.
61. Enrollment in the program was increased from 1.5% to 15% of Milwaukee public school
children. McFarland, supra note 12, at 117-18.
62. Id. at 118.
63. Id.
64. Id.
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of up to $5,000 per child." However, despite the legislature's efforts to
neutralize the program, its constitutionality was challenged immediately.'
In 1995, the Milwaukee Teachers Education Association filed actions in
state circuit court, asserting that the amended voucher program violated the
Establishment Clause because it provided state aid to private religious
schools.67 For three years the program stood in limbo as it bounced around
Wisconsin's state and appellate courts, primarily losing its constitutional
battles, not on Establishment Clause, but on state constitutional grounds.68
In June of 1998, however, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin held that
Milwaukee Parental Choice Program did not violate the Establishment
Clause, nor any state constitutional provisions.6 9 The Supreme Court of the
United States denied certiorari and allowed the decision to stand."0 For many
advocates of school vouchers, the Milwaukee challenge signaled a
promising future for voucher programs and their possible success at
withstanding constitutional scrutiny.'

65. See Metcalf & Tait, supra note 13.
66. See Jackson v. Benson, 578 N.W.2d 602, 609 (Wis. 1998).
67. Id.
68. The circuit court found that the amended voucher program violated the religious benefits and
compelled support clauses, the public or local bill prohibitions, and the public purpose of the
Wisconsin constitution. Id. at 609-10.
69. Id. at 620 ("Since the amended MPCP has a secular purpose, does not have the primary effect
of advancing religion, and does not create an excessive entanglement, it is not invalid under the
Establishment Clause."); see also Hoffman, supra note 12, at 1110. Hoffman explains the
Wisconsin courts' dilemma:
The differing opinions of the Wisconsin Appeals and Supreme Court illustrate the
difficulties attending any decision on the constitutionality of school vouchers for
parochial students. Their disagreement turned essentially on one question: Is Nyquist still
good law? If it is, voucher programs such as the MPCP will at some point be struck; if
not, such programs will stand and other states will be able to implement similar programs
of their own.
Id. But as McFarland argues, the Court in Nyquist "refused to determine 'whether an educational
assistance program that was both neutral and indirect would survive an Establishment Clause
challenge.'... Therefore, the Wisconsin Supreme Court correctly determined that its holding should
not be controlled by the Nyquist decision." McFarland, supra note 12, at 122-23 ("Jackson correctly
resolved the constitutional question left open by Nyquist and other Establishment Clause decisions
by holding that a religion-neutral program which provides indirect economic assistance to students
of private schools, without regard to their religious affiliations, does not violate the Establishment
Clause."). For further analysis of this issue, see discussion infra Part V.

70. 525 U.S. 997 (1998).
71. See Clint Bolick, Milwaukee: The End is a New Beginning, Liberty and Law, Vol. 7, No. 5
(Dec. 1998), at http://www.ij.org/publications/liberty/l1998/1 12-98-a.html (last visited Jan. 21,
2002) ("For school choice proponents nationwide, the decision demonstrates that the education
establishment and its allies can be beaten."); McFarland, supra note 12, at 125 ("The Milwaukee
Parental Choice Program is a milestone in the constitutional debate over school choice.... Jackson
signals a retreat from a judicially-enforced strict separation of church and state, and a return to the
governmental neutrality toward religion intended by the drafters of the First Amendment."). But see
Hoffman, supra note 12, at 1086-87 ("Because the Court is deeply divided over how to interpret the
Establishment Clause, and Jackson was a facial challenge to the Wisconsin voucher program, the
Court may have decided that the issue is not yet ripe .... The Court has, therefore, wisely adopted a
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2. The Cleveland Scholarship and Tutorial Grant Program
The second major and currently most prominent inner-city school
voucher program is the Cleveland Scholarship and Tutorial Grant Program,
which was implemented in 1995.72 The educational crisis in Cleveland's
public schools had become so pronounced that a United States District Court
ordered the State of Ohio to take over the administration of the Cleveland
City School District.73 Ohio Governor George Volinovich proposed a plan,
which the Ohio legislature subsequently enacted, to provide private school
tuition scholarships to low-income families within the Cleveland School
District.74 The program included both a scholarship program, enabling
students to attend "alternative schools," and a tutorial program for
schools were
Cleveland's public school children. 5 Public and private
6
eligible to participate in the program as alternative schools.
The program specified that recipients were to be chosen by lot and to
receive tuition based on their level of family income.77 In addition, the state
distributed scholarship money by sending a check to the chosen school made
payable to the parents, with the parents endorsing the check to the school."
There were no restrictions on the private school's use of the money." In the
three years following its implementation, no public schools registered for
participation in the Cleveland Program." Of the fifty-six schools registered
for the 1999-2000 school year, forty-six were church-affiliated.8' Thus,
ninety-six percent of the students enrolled in the program attended sectarian
schools. 2
Like the Milwaukee Parental Choice Program, the Cleveland
Scholarship Program underwent rapid constitutional attack. In its initial test,
the program was struck down in 1999 by the Supreme Court of Ohio, which
found that the pilot program violated the state constitution's "one-subject

'wait and see' approach.").
72. See Metcalf & Tait, supra note 13; see also OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3313.975 (Anderson
1999) (detailing regulations for pilot school program).
73. Simmons-Harris v. Zelman, 72 F. Supp. 2d 834, 836 (1999).
74. Metcalf& Tait, supra note 13.
75. Simmons-Harris v. Zelman, 72 F. Supp. 2d at 836.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 836-37.
82. Id. at 837.

rule."83 The Ohio legislature responded quickly by re-enacting the program
in all pertinent respects." This proved short-lived, however, when on
August 24, 1999, United States District Judge Solomon Oliver, Jr. issued a
preliminary injunction barring the program from beginning its fifth year. "
This action, coming one day before the start of school, prompted alarm from

parents and an immediate appeal to higher courts. "6 With over three
thousand students facing the possibility of being forced to leave their private
school after the fall semester, on November 5, 1999, the United States
Supreme Court, in a five to four ruling, granted a request for stay of the
preliminary injunction pending disposition by the Sixth Circuit.87 The Sixth
Circuit sent the case back to the district court for final determination of the
issue. "8 On December 20, 1999, Judge Oliver permanently enjoined the
State of Ohio from continuing its voucher program.88 Following appeal, in
December 2000, the Sixth Circuit upheld the injunction and affirmed the
decision of the district court that the Cleveland Program violated the
Establishment Clause.9 Both sides now await the Supreme Court's decision
whether to hear the case. 9'

As evidenced by the above two examples, the voucher movement in the
United States is growing, but contentiously. In addition to Ohio and
Wisconsin, many other states have experimented with voucher and voucherlike programs. In 1999, Arizona,92 Florida, 3 and Vermont" passed voucher

83. Simmons-Harris v. Goff, 711 N.E.2d 203, 216 (Ohio 1999). The court found, however, that
the program did not violate the Establishment Clause. Id. at 211 ("We conclude that the School
Voucher Program has a secular legislative purpose, does not have the primary effect of advancing
religion, and does not excessively entangle government with religion.").
84. Simmons-Harris v. Zelman, 72 F. Supp. 2d at 836.
85. Simmons-Harris v. Zelman, 54 F. Supp. 2d 725, 729 (N.D. Ohio 1999). Judge Oliver found
that "[tlhe participating schools are overwhelmingly sectarian. This means that parents cannot make
an educational choice without regard to whether the school is parochial or not. Consequently, the
Cleveland Program has the primary effect of advancing religion." Id. at 741.
86. Mark Vosburgh & Scott Stephens, Judge Suspends School Vouchers: Ruling Hits Families of
4,000 Area Pupils, THE PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland), Aug. 25, 1999, at IA.
87. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 528 U.S. 983 (1999); see also Linda Greenhouse, Justices
Restore Cleveland's School Voucher Programfor Now, N. Y. TIMES ABSTRACTS, Nov. 6, 1999, at
Sec. A.
88. Simmons-Harris v. Zelman, 72 F. Supp. 2d at 841.
89. id. at 865. Judge Oliver found that "[i]n all pertinent respects, the Voucher Program is
factually indistinguishable from the tuition reimbursement program struck down in Community for
Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist." Id. at 846 (citation omitted).
90. Simmons-Harris v. Zelman, 234 F.3d 945 (6th Cir. 2000); see also Bill Sloat, Future of
School Vouchers Goes Before Appeal Judges, THE PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland), June 21, 2000, at
2B. For further discussion of the Sixth Circuit's reasoning, see infra Part V.
91. See supra note 11.
92. See Kotterman v. Killian, 972 P.2d 606 (Ariz. 1999), cert denied, 528 U.S. 921 (1999)
(upholding state program that gives tax credits to those who donate money to school tuition
organizations).
93. Bolick, supra note 46, at 248.
94. See Campbell v. Manchester Bd. of Sch. Dir., 641 A.2d 352 (Vt. 1994) (upholding state
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legislation.95 However, Indiana, Maine,9 and North Dakota have recently
defeated proposed voucher programs in their legislatures. 9 Nevertheless,
many states have active voucher legislation pending.98 With respect to a
national voucher program, the recent election of George W. Bush, a voucher
proponent, offered hope for a voucher experiment on the federal level in
2001. 9 However, the voucher proposal in President Bush's highly touted

Education Bill received criticism from both sides of the political aisle, and
was eventually conceded because of a lack of congressional support."
C. The Movement Toward School Choice

With all this commotion surrounding the voucher movement, one may

wonder, are they effective? Studies have yet to yield any real definitive
answers, particularly because of the relative novelty of full-fledged voucher
programs.' However, several preliminary studies analyzing the Milwaukee
tuition reimbursement program).
95. Kilberg, supra note 13, at 739 n.2.
96. See Strout v. Albanese, 178 F.3d 57 (1st Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 931 (1999)
(upholding Maine legislation that excluded religious schools from a program allowing local school
districts without secondary schools to reimburse parents a specified amount for high school tuition in
nonsectarian schools); see also Bagley v. Raymond Sch. Dep't, 728 A.2d 127 (Me. 1999), cert.
denied, 528 U.S. 947 (1999) (rejecting challenges under the Free Exercise, Establishment, and Equal
Protection Clauses to the exclusion of sectarian schools and finding that if religious schools were
included in the tuition reimbursement program, they would receive a direct government benefit in
violation of the Establishment Clause).
97. Kilberg, supra note 13, at 739 n.4.
98. Id. at 739 n.3. States with active legislation pending include: "Alaska, California, Delaware,
Georgia, Hawaii, Kansas, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, Nebraska, New
Hampshire, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Virginia, and Washington. Some of these are voucher
programs, others are tuition tax credits." Id. The following states are expected to introduce voucher
or tuition tax credit programs in 2000: Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Mississippi, New Jersey, New Mexico,
Pennsylvania, Utah, Vermont, and West Virginia. Id.
99. Elizabeth Auster, Bush Disappoints School Voucher Advocates, President's Pullback on
Education Bill Expected by Many, THE PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland), May 4, 2001, at 10A ("When
President Bush was elected, advocates of school vouchers were thrilled. With Republicans
controlling both the White House and Congress, they thought, the time was ripe for a national
version of Cleveland's experiment.").
100. Id. Auster reported:
[W]hen Bush conceded defeat on the [voucher] issue this week, before Congress even
voted on it, voucher advocates were disappointed .... Bush said he still supports
vouchers, but acknowledged he doesn't have the votes in Congress for his voucher
proposal to pass. "There are people that are afraid of choice," Bush said. "They really
are. And I'm a realist. I understand that. It doesn't change my opinion, but it's not
going to change the votes, either."
Id.
101. Metcalf & Tait, supra note 13 ("It must be acknowledged at the outset that definitive answers
about the fundamental goodness of publicly funded voucher programs are not now available and
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and Cleveland programs reveal distinct evidence about the success of school
voucher programs.' °2 First, most studies of voucher programs reveal
increased parental satisfaction with the education of their child.' 3 Second,
voucher programs provide additional educational choices to families of
children who have the highest risk of school failure."'° Third, only a small
portion of eligible families apply for available vouchers."'5 Fourth, whether
voucher programs actually improve academic achievement cannot yet be
determined."' These findings show that, in the least, voucher programs have
been successful in reaching their initial goals of "providing private school
educational opportunities for the children of economically disadvantaged,
inner-city families.""
Due to continued educational problems and the initial success of
voucher programs in providing greater opportunities for low-income
families, public perception has shifted in favor of the school choice
movement.' "° For example, over ninety-five percent of adults think that
parents should be given greater choice with regard to their children's
education."'" In addition, fifty percent of public school parents are in favor

may never be."). But see VITERITTI, supra note 20, at 15 ("Most empiricists would agree that there
is no substantial evidence to suggest that choice would be educationally harmful to disadvantaged
students.").
102. Metcalf & Tait, supra note 13. Metcalf and Tait detail the findings of prominent voucher
studies, including John Witte's study of the Milwaukee Program, and Jay P. Greene, William G.
Howell, and Paul E. Peterson's examination of the Cleveland Program, while at the same time
detailing their own findings. See also Jay P. Greene et al., An Evaluation of the Cleveland
Scholarship Program,Program on Education Policy and Governance, Harvard Univ., Sept. 1997, at
http://www.schoolchoices.org/roo/clevelandl.htm (last visited Jan. 21, 2002) (concluding that "both
test score and parental survey data provide strong justification for the legislative decision to continue
and expand the [Cleveland Program] for another year."); Hanna Skandera & Richard Sousa, School
Choice: The Evidence Comes In, in 2 HOOVER DIGEST 24, 27 (Peter Robinson ed., 2001) (answering
critics arguments that voucher programs result in underperforming public schools, and finding that
"as participation [in the Milwaukee Parental School Choice Program] increased the score of the
students left behind increased, not decreased, as alarmists would predict.").
103. Metcalf & Tait, supra note 13 ("Participating parents were dissatisfied with their children's
former public schools and chose to enroll their children in private schools for improved educational
quality and greater safety.").
104. Id. ("Participating families are of lower income than typical public school families, they
come primarily from ethnic minority groups, and they are usually headed by a single mother.").
105. Id. ("Neither voucher program has produced the mass exodus from public schools that was
forecast.").
106. Id. ("When prior achievement and relevant demographic variables are controlled, the
achievement of voucher students is not consistently different from that of public school students.").
107. Id.
108. Bolick, supra note 46, at 248 ("Public opinion is moving strongly and steadily in favor of
parental choice."). Bolick gives several reasons for this shift: (1) public schools continue to
underachieve; (2) parental choice program news is promising; and (3) changing demographics. Id.
Moreover, in areas in which voucher programs have been implemented, the approval rate is
generally higher. Id. ("The closer people reside to the program, the more likely they appear to
support parental choice.").
109. Metcalf & Tait, supra note 13.
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of some type of redirection of public money for vouchers to allow parents
the choice of whether to send their children to either a public or private
school."' Moreover, eighty percent of minority families living in the innercity view vouchers as a desirable alternative to current educational options."'
Despite such approval, voucher opponents continue to stall or otherwise
impede parental choice programs across the country."' Such opponents
argue that vouchers subsidize private schools while draining money from
already financially strapped public schools, provide little accountability, and
result in no overall educational improvement."3 Interesting, however, is the
chasm between the civil rights organizations that routinely challenge
vouchers, and the minority individuals who are vouchers' greatest
supporters."4 According to one commentator, "[n]ever has the climate for
[educational] reform been so vibrant, nor the need for reform more
urgent.... [It is] the primary civil rights goal of the millennium ....
Based on the current storm surrounding the voucher issue, the Supreme
Court is likely to eventually weigh in on the legal soundness of voucher
programs, and the Cleveland Voucher Program stands as the prime
candidate." 6

110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Elliot Mincberg, Vouchers, the Constitution and the Court, 10 GEO. MASON U. Civ. RTS.
L.J. 155 (Win.-Spr. 1999-2000) (arguing that vouchers are "a bad policy choice.").
114. See Bolick, supra note 46, at 248 ("Black Americans consider education the top national
priority."). Bolick argues, "It is time for politicians to recognize the will of the people, to reject the
entreaties of special interest groups, and to make parental choice a reality." Id. at 249.
115. Id. ("If we can do only one thing in public policy to improve prospects for minority
individuals and economically disadvantaged people, there is nothing more tangible or important than
making good on the promise of equal educational opportunities."); see also MOE, supra note 20, at 1
("As the new century unfolds, the most controversial issue in American education is the issue of
school vouchers.").
116. Greenhouse, supra note 11, at 15A ("The Cleveland voucher case has been seen for several
years as the likely Supreme Court test of the concept's constitutionality ....Granting a stay of a
lower court's decision is usually a strong indication of the justices' interest in eventually hearing the
case."); Cleveland's Challenge, WALL ST. J., June 20, 2000, at A26, available at 2000 WL-WSJ
3033485 ("Cleveland may become the key test case for vouchers.").

III. THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE

A. Origins:

The first Americans were a religious people. "7 Many of the first settlers
came to America to escape religious persecution by an absolute sovereign,
and to establish a society in which they would be free to worship as they
wished. In his sermon A Model of ChristianCharity, originally delivered on
the deck of the ship Arabella on its way to the new world, John Winthrop
explained that the first American settlers had entered into a "covenant" with
God to found a new society according to His laws and to do His work."8
This society under God would be looked upon by the rest of the world as an
ideal model to follow:
For wee must consider that wee shall be as a citty upon a hill. The
eyes of all people are uppon us. Soe that if wee shall deale falsely
with our God in this worke wee have undertaken, and 'soe cause
Him to withdrawe His present help from us, wee shall be made a
story and a byword through the world. Wee shall open the mouthes
of enemies to speake evill of the wayes of God, and all professors
for God's sake. Wee shall shame the faces of many of God's
worthy servants, and cause theire preayers to be turned into curses
upon us til wee be consumed out of the good land wither we are a
goeing .....
Religion played a central role in the first American settlements and in the
growth of democracy. 2 ° When the first settlers gathered together to

117. See Viteritti, supra note 21, at 661-62; see also 1 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN
AMERICA 303-14 (Phillips Bradley ed., Alfred A. Knopf 1963) ("On my arrival in the United States
the religious aspect of the country was the first thing that struck my attention; and the longer I stayed
there, the more I perceived the great political consequences resulting from this new state of things.");
Anthony Cardinal Bevilacqua, Constitutionality of Tuition Vouchers: Address Delivered to
Marquette University Law School, October 7, 1992, 76 MARQ. L. REV. 487, 488 (1993) ("We are a
religious people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme Being."); Church of the Holy Trinity v.
United States, 143 U.S. 457, 465 (1892) ("[N]o purpose of action against religion can be imputed to
any legislation, state or national, because this is a religious people.").
118. DOUGLAS W. KMIEC & STEPHEN B. PRESSER, THE HISTORY, PHILOSOPHY AND STRUCTURE

OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 4 (1998) (quoting John Winthrop, A Model of Christian Charity
(1630), reprinted in 1 A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF AMERICAN LIFE 66-99 (Jack P. Greene ed.,
1966)).
119. Id.
120. RICHARD JOHN NEUHAUS, THE NAKED PUBLIC SQUARE 95 (2d ed. 1996) ("The contention
that the American enterprise is derived from religious belief is widely, although not universally,
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societies, they formed compacts
establish methods of organizing these new
2
'
consent.1
popular
by
governed
God,
under
As the American colonies grew, the religious focus developed into
various establishments of religion.'22 Traditionally, an "establishment of
religion" was defined as "a legal union of government and [one] religion.' 23
In the eighteenth century, such "[c]onventional establishments of religion
existed in the southern colonies of Virginia, Maryland, North Carolina,
South Carolina, and Georgia."' 24 These colonies adopted the Church of
Within these colonies, citizens were
England as their state church."
required to attend the state church and to learn only its tenets in schools or
elsewhere. 6 Moreover, "dissenters" from the established faith enjoyed little
protection under the laws and were disqualified from service in any public
office.'" The northern colonies of New York, Massachusetts, Connecticut,
and New Hampshire did not subscribe to any one establishment of religion,
permitting several established churches to coexist; however, in each of these
the largest establishment generally controlled the religious
colonies,
2
power.

1

acknowledged.").
121. See, e.g., The Plymouth Combination, or The Mayflower Compact, reprinted in COLONIAL
ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 31-32 (Donald S. Lutz ed., 1998). In this "oldest
surviving compact based on popular consent," the first American settlers declared:
In the Name of God, Amen. We whose Names are under-written, the Loyal Subjects of
our dread Soveraign Lord King James, by the grace of God of Great Britian, Franceand
Ireland, King, Defender of the Faith etc. Having undertaken for the glory of God, and
advancement of the Christian Faith, and the Honour of our K[i]ng and Countrey, a
Voyage to plant the first Colony in the Northern parts of Virginia; Do by these Presents,
solemnly and mutually, in the presence of God and one another, Covenant and Combine
our selves together into a Civil Body Politick, for our better ordering and preservation,
and furtherance of the ends aforesaid: and by virtue hereof do enact, constitute, and
frame, such just and equal Laws, Ordinances, Acts, Constitutions and Officers, from time
to time, as shall be thought most meet and convenient for the general good of the Colony;
unto which we promise all due submission and obedience.
Id. at 32 (emphasis in original).
122. LEONARD W. LEVY, THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE: RELIGION AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
1(1986) ("Those colonies, although resentful of British violations of American rights, discriminated
against Roman Catholics, Jews, and even dissenting Protestants who refused to comply with local
laws benefitting establishments of religion.").
123. Id. at 4.
124. Id. at 5.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 4.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 10. Four colonies, Rhode Island, Pennsylvania, Delaware, and New Jersey never had
an "establishment of religion." Id. at 9-10.

After the Revolution, however, the states moved to disestablish
religion.' 9 Many state constitutions contained specific anti-establishment
provisions.'30 James Madison and Thomas Jefferson waged perhaps the most
fervent and well-documented colonial struggle for disestablishment in their
staunchly Anglican state of Virginia.'3' The Virginia Constitution of 1776
guaranteed the "free exercise" of religion, but did not address the issue of
religious establishment.'32 In 1779, believing that religion was a personal
matter between God and the individual, Jefferson introduced his Bill for
Religious Freedom to the Virginia legislature."' Jefferson's proposal
declared:
That no man shall be compelled to frequent or support any religious
worship, place, or ministry whatsoever, nor shall be enforced,
restrained, molested, or burthened in his body or goods, nor shall
otherwise suffer, on account of his religious opinions or belief; but
that all men shall be free to profess, and by argument to maintain,
their opinions in matters of religion, and that the same shall in no
wise diminish, enlarge, or affect their civil capacities."'
Strong opposition from establishment forces led by Patrick Henry ensued,
and neither Jefferson's nor any counter proposal could command a majority
in the legislature.'35 However, in 1784, a more moderate general assessment
bill was passed that ostensibly allowed for multiple establishments of
religion, but still levied moderate taxes to support the Christian faith.' 6 This
general assessment raised the ire of many Virginians, including James
Madison, who responded by writing his Memorial and Remonstrance
Against Religious Assessments:

Because we hold it for a fundamental and undeniable truth, "that
Religion or the duty which we owe to our Creator and the manner of
discharging it, can be directed only by reason and conviction, not by

129. Id. at 25.
130. Id. For example, New Jersey's 1776 constitution provided that no person should:
[Elver be obliged to pay tithes, taxes, or any other rates, for the purpose of building or
repairing any other church or churches, place or places of worship, or for the maintenance
of any minister or ministry, contrary to what he believes to be right, or has deliberately or
voluntarily engaged himself to perform.
Id.
131. Id. at 51-53.
132. Id. at 51.
133. Id. at 53.
134. THOMAS JEFFERSON, WRITINGS 346-47 (Merrill D. Peterson ed., 1984).
135. LEVY, supra note 122, at 53-54.
136. Id. at 54.
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force or violence." The Religion then of every man must be left to
the conviction and conscience of every man; and it is the right of
every man to exercise it as37these may dictate. This right is in its
nature an unalienable right.
Madison's Remonstrance galvanized the Virginia

population, which

responded by electing an overwhelmingly anti-establishment legislature in
178539.' This legislature passed Jefferson's bill and let the assessment bill
die.1

At the Constitutional Convention of 1787, little mention was made of
religion.'" Despite the clear invocation of God in the Declaration of
Independence,141 and the founders' avowed belief in God,' the Constitution
contains no mention of God at all.'4 3 During the First Congress, however,
JAMES MADISON ON RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 55-56 (Robert S. Alley ed., 1985).
LEVY, supra note 122, at 59.
Id.
Id. at 63.
The text of the Declaration of Independence states:
When in the Course of human Events, it becomes necessary for one People to dissolve
the Political Bands which have connected them with another, and to assume among the
Powers of the Earth, the separate and equal Station to which the Laws of Nature and of
Nature's God entitle them.... We hold these Truths to be self-evident, that all Men are
created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable
Rights ....
THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 1 & 2 (U.S. 1776) (emphasis added).
142. See KMIEC & PRESSER, supra note 118, at 129 (noting that, for example, George Washington
in his first inaugural address observed, "the propitious smiles of Heaven can never be expected on a
nation that disregards the eternal rules of order and right, which Heaven itself has ordained."
(quoting GEORGE WASHINGTON, FIRST INAUGURAL ADDRESS (Apr. 30, 1789), reprinted in GEORGE
WASHINGTON A COLLECTION 460, 462 (W.B. Allen ed., 1988))). Kmiec and Presser also point out
that John Adams believed the Old Testament to be a fundamental building block of American
culture. Id. at 5. In a letter written to a colleague in 1809, Adams stated, "I should believe that
chance had ordered the Jews to preserve and propagate to all mankind the doctrine of a supreme,
intelligent, wise, almighty sovereign of the universe, which I believe to be the great essential
principle of all morality, and consequently of all civilization." Id. at 5-6; see also Viteritti,
supra note 21, at 716 ("Our Constitution was crafted by individuals with a deep commitment to
religious freedom.").
143. LEVY, supra note 122, at 63. The absence of any reference to God or religion in the text of
the Constitution, however, can be traced to the framers' belief in the separation of powers, which
among other things, was designed to ensure religious liberty. Id. ("[T]he drafters of the Declaration,
and the framers of the Constitution, believed that government authority must necessarily be limited
to leave room for individuals to pursue moral instruction within their freely chosen religious
community."); see also Arlin M. Adams & Charles J. Emmerich, A Heritage of Religious Liberty,
137 U. PA. L. REV. 1559, 1599 (1989) ("The separation concept, however, is really a servant of an
even greater goal; it is a means, along with concepts such as accommodation and neutrality, to
achieve the ideal of religious liberty in a free society."); KMIEC & PRESSER, supra note 118, at 129
("[D]enominational differences merely reveal the founder's justification for narrowing the role of
government by prudentially enumerating federal power, and securing religious freedom in the Bill of
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.

James Madison proposed a series of amendments to the Constitution, which
included a section on religion: "[t]he civil rights of none shall be abridged on
account of religious belief or worship, nor shall any national religion be
established, nor shall the full and equal rights of conscience be in any
manner, or on any pretext, infringed."'" This proposal would be condensed
into the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, providing that,
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof ....
B. A Wall of Separation?
On January 1, 1802, in a letter to the Danbury Baptist Association,
explaining his refusal to honor a national day of fasting and thanksgiving
first begun by George Washington. and John Adams, President Thomas
Jefferson wrote:
Believing with you that religion is a matter which lies solely
between man and his God, that he owes account to none other for
his faith or his worship, that the legislative powers of government
reach actions only, and not opinions, I contemplate with sovereign
reverence that act of the whole American people which declared
that their legislature should "make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof,"
thus building a wall of separationbetween church and State.'46
Jefferson's "wall of separation" has in many ways come to stand for the de
facto popular meaning of the First Amendment; that there must be an
"absolute separation" between church and state. 4 7 To be sure, commentators
Rights.... They anticipated, maybe better than they knew, that where God is banished, the state-as
a substitute source of ultimate authority-expands rapidly."); Martha McCarthy, Religion and
Education: Whither the Establishment Clause?, 75 IND. L.J. 123, 126 (2000) ("In its most basic
form, separationinsm reflects the sentiment that religious liberty will be enhanced by adhering to the
principle that religion is not the concern of government.").
144. LEVY, supra note 122, at 75.
145. U.S. CONST. amend. I. The First Amendment incorporated "John Locke's philosophy that
'the care of souls cannot belong to the civil magistrate."' McCarthy, supra note 143, at 123; see also
JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 182 (1690) ("The Natural Liberty of Man is to be

free from any Superior Power on Earth, and not to be under the Will or Legislative Authority of
Man, but to have only the Law of Nature for his Rule.").
146. THOMAS JEFFERSON, WRITINGS 510 (Merrill D. Peterson ed., 1984) (emphasis added). The

phrase "wall of separation" can first be traced to Roger Williams, who fled Massachusetts in 1636 to
establish a settlement in Providence, one of the few colonial settlements without an established
church supported by public taxes. VITERITTI, supra note 20, at 118. Williams' separationist
ideology was designed to protect the church from civil authority. Id. In contrast, Jefferson's goal
was to ensure that the church did not contaminate the state. Id. at 118-19.
147. Professor Leonard Levy argues:
(H]istory, seen in the context of the drive to add a bill of rights to the Constitution in
order to restrict the powers of the national government, proves that the framers of the
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have admitted that we may never know its true meaning.' 8 Nevertheless,
history does not support the strict separationist approach." 9
In addition to drafting the Bill of Rights, the First Congress also enacted
legislation to a national day of thanksgiving and prayer. 50 The same
Congress

also

approved the Northwest Ordinance, which

contained

compacts between the original states and the people of the future states in
the territory north and west of the Ohio River.'5 ' Article III of the Northwest
Ordinance stated, "Religion, morality, and knowledge being necessary to

good government and the happiness of mankind, schools and the means of
education shall forever be encouraged."'5 2 Rather than strict separation,
history supports the view that Madison
meant exactly what he said: "no
53
national religion shall be established."'
Several Constitutional scholars concur with this view. Commenting on
the meaning of the First Amendment, Justice Joseph Story noted:

The real object of the amendment was not to countenance, much
less to advance, Mahometanism, or Judaism, or infidelity, by
prostrating Christianity; but to exclude all rivalry among Christian
sects, and to prevent any national ecclesiastical establishment which
should give to a hierarchy the exclusive patronage of the national

government."

establishment clause meant to make explicit a point on which the entire nation agreed:
The United States had no power to legislate on the subject of religion.
LEVY, supra note 122, at 89; see also Hoffman, supra note 12, at 1091-92 ("According to the 'strict
separationists,' the Establishment Clause prohibits all government support for religion and churches.
The 'accommodationists,' on the other hand, argue that the Constitution permits government to give
support to religion, provided it does not prefer one religion over another.").
148. McCarthy, supra note 143, at 123 ("[T]he original intent cannot be delineated with
certainty."); see also LEVY, supra note 122, at 84 ("The history of the drafting of the establishment
clause does not provide us with an understanding of what was meant by 'an establishment of
religion."').
149. McCarthy, supra note 143, at 127 ("There is considerable evidence that adherence to an
absolute separation of church and state never has been universal in our nation ....
").
150. Viteritti, supra note 21, at 663, 716 ("Although their model of government was designed to
prohibit the formal union between public and ecclesiastical authority, their notion of religious liberty
did not require a complete separation between church and state.").
151. NORTHWEST TERRITORIAL GOVERNMENT, ORDINANCE OF 1787, 1 U.S.C. at LI (1988).
152. Id. at LIU; see also id. at art. I ("[N]o person, demeaning himself in a peaceable and orderly
manner, shall ever be molested on account of his mode of worship, or religious sentiments, in the
said territories.").
153. See VITERtrn, supra note 20, at 121-26 ("[A] reading of Madison demands that no priority
should be given to one religion over another."). But see LEVY, supra note 122, at 75 (arguing that
"[t]he term 'national religion' has ambiguous connotations.").
154. 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 606

According to Story, the national government must not prefer one religion
over another, as in supporting one national religion. Professor Thomas M.
Cooley agreed, "By establishment of religion is meant the setting up or
recognition of a state church, or at least the conferring upon one church of
special favors and advantages which are denied to others."' 5
Such
interpretations focus on equality rather than separation, and come much
closer to uniting the5 6framer's belief in the importance of both religion and

individual freedom.'
Commentators may never agree as to the original purpose or meaning of
the First Amendment."7 This confusion is perhaps most clearly exhibited in
the Supreme Court's attempts at interpreting the Establishment Clause.
C. The Supreme Court's Treatment of the Establishment Clause
1. Early Supreme Court Jurisprudence

For 150 years after the ratification of the First Amendment, the
Establishment Clause was virtually ignored by the Supreme Court. ' In
(Thomas Cooley ed., Little, Brown, and Company, 4th ed. 1873).
155. THOMAS M. COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 224 (Andrew C. McLaughlin ed., Little,
Brown, and Co., 3d ed. 1898) ("It was never intended by the Constitution that the government
should be prohibited from recognizing religion ....
");see also KMIEC & PRESSER, supra note 118,
at 190 ("There is ample historical evidence that the word 'establishment,' as used by the framers of
the First Amendment in 1791 meant what it had in Europe-government's 'exclusive patronage' of
one church.").
156. Akhil Reed Amar, Substance and Method in the Year 2000, 28 PEPP. L. REV. 601, 629
(2001) ("Even at the Founding, one of the big ideas of the First Amendment was Equalitygovernment should not favor or disfavor any religion, just as it should not favor or disfavor a speaker
because of his political viewpoint under the neighboring Free Speech clause."). Similar to this
approach is the preferentialist approach, espoused by Edward S. Corwin. See Edward S. Corwin,
The Supreme Court as a National School Board, 14 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 3, 10 (1949) ("In a
word, what the 'establishment of religion! clause of the First Amendment does, and all that it does,
is to forbid Congress to give any religious faith, sect, or denomination a preferred status ..
(emphasis in original).
157. McCarthy, supra note 143, at 124 ("[C]ommentators and Justices have voiced their
frustration with Establishment Clause jurisprudence by referring to it as 'chaotic,' 'doctrinal
gridlock,' a 'legal quagmire,' contradictory and unprincipled, 'ad hoc,' 'intuitive,' and a 'maze."').
158. Jeffrey Stiltner, Note, Rethinking the Wall of Separation: Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills
School District-Isthis the End of Lemon?, 23 CAP. U. L. REV. 823, 825 (1994). Stiltner explains:
The lack of Establishment Clause adjudication was due to the fact that until Everson, the
clause applied only to the federal government. To the extent that establishment issues
arose, if at all, they arose at the state level and were subsequently decided on state
grounds. It was only with Everson that the Establishment Clause was selectively
incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment.
Id.; see also John M. Flynn, Note, ConstitutionalLaw-Accommodation of Religion-The Answer to
the Invocation Dilemma-Jagerv. Douglas County School District,24 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1045,
1052 (1989) (commenting that,
[D]uring the first 150 years of establishment clause jurisprudence, it seems that the
principle concern of the Court was to safeguard religion as government made efforts to
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1947, however, the Court decided the landmark case Everson v. Board of
Education of Ewing Township.'59 In Everson, a taxpayer challenged a New

Jersey statute that provided reimbursement to parents for money spent on the
bus transportation of their children to both public and Catholic parochial
schools.'" The statute was challenged in two respects: that it violated the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the First
Amendment, as a "law respecting an establishment of religion."' 6' The Court

quickly dismissed the due process argument, and focused on the
After a lengthy historical and
Establishment Clause question.161
philosophical analysis of the origins of the Establishment Clause, 6 1 the Court
arrived at a definition:

The 'establishment of religion' clause of the First Amendment
means at least this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government can
set up a church. Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid

all religions, or prefer one religion over another. Neither can force
nor influence a person to go to or to remain away from church
against his will or force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any
religion. No person can be punished for entertaining or professing
religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for church attendance or nonattendance. No tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to

encroach upon it. Laws were upheld provided that they allowed religion to flourish.
What today might be considered the most grotesque example of establishment of religion
was embraced as undergirding America's religious tradition. Much change was yet to
come.).
159. 330 U.S. 1 (1947). Everson is widely considered:
[Tihe single most important American constitutional law case in the realm of the
Establishment of Religion Clause. There, for the first time-over a century and a half
after the Clause was added to the Constitution-the U.S. Supreme Court set forth a
comprehensive interpretation of the minimal prohibitions that the Court said were
required by the phrase: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion .... "
CORD, supra note 23, at 109 (emphasis in original).
160. Everson, 330 U.S. at 3.
161. Id. at 5-8.
162. Id. at 6-7.
163. Id. at 8-14. Justice Black explained:
A large proportion of the early settlers of this country came here from Europe to escape
the bondage of laws which compelled them to support and attend government favored
churches.... These practices of the old world were transplanted to and began to thrive in
the soil of the new America.... These practices became so commonplace as to shock the
freedom-loving colonials into a feeling of abhorrence. .... It was these feelings which
found expression in the First Amendment.
Id.

support any religious activities or institutions, whatever they may be
called, or whatever form they may adopt to teach or practice
religion. Neither a state nor the Federal Government can, openly or
secretly, participate in the affairs of any religious organizations or
groups and vice versa. In the words of Jefferson, the clause against
establishment of religion by law was intended to erect "a wall of
separation between Church and State."'"
Despite the Court's finding that the "wall [between church and state] must
be kept high and impregnable," the Court held that under this standard, the
New Jersey statute presented no Establishment Clause violation.'65 Justice
Black stated, "[W]e cannot say that the First Amendment prohibits New
Jersey from spending taxraised funds to pay the bus fares of parochial school
pupils as a part of a general program under which it pays the fares of pupils
attending public and other schools."'" The Court reasoned that bus fare
reimbursement was analogous to state programs that provide police, fire
protection, and public utilities.'67 Without such "ordinary" services, parents
may be deterred from sending their children to church schools, or the
schools may not be able to operate.'68 According to the Court, such an
adversarial relationship was not required by the First Amendment, rather, it
required the state to be "neutral in its relations with groups of religious
believers and non-believers."' 69
As did the majority, in dissent, Justice Rutledge provided an in-depth
historical account of the Establishment Clause,'70 but came to a more
absolutist conclusion:
The Amendment's purpose was not to strike merely at the official
establishment of a single sect, creed or religion, outlawing only a
formal relation such as had prevailed in England and some of the
colonies. Necessarily it was to uproot all such relationships. But
the object was broader than separating church and state in this
narrow sense.
It was to create a complete and permanent
separationof the spheres of religious activity and civil authority by

164. Id. at 15-16 (citing Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878)).
165. Id. at 18 ("The First Amendment has erected a wall between church and state....
We could
not approve of the -slightest breach. New Jersey has not breached it here.").
166. Id. at 17.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 17-18.
169. Id. at 18.
170. See id. at 31-43 (Rutledge, J., dissenting) ("The Amendment was broadly but not loosely
phrased. It is the compact and exact summation of its author's views formed during [Madison's]
long struggle for religious freedom.").
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comprehensively forbidding every form of public aid or support for
religion.'
For Justice Rutledge, funds raised by taxation could not, no matter what
their purpose, be given to another to support their religious training or
belief.7 2 Thus, the New Jersey statute violated the Establishment Clause.'
Everson was significant in that it established two means by which
government aid to religion could be theoretically justified."' First, aid
distributed neutrally to the public at large was not considered aid to
religion. 5 Second, aid to religious education is not violative of the
Establishment Clause as long as it can be characterized as aid to children,
rather than aid to the religious institution. " 6
One year later, in McCollum v. Board of Education," the Supreme

Court signaled that the Establishment Clause would continue to play a major
role in church state relations when it applied the Clause to the states through
the Fourteenth Amendment. 8 In McCollum, taxpayers challenged a
Champaign, Illinois "released time" program, which allowed public school
students to attend weekly religion classes on their public school campuses."'
Parents gave permission for their child to attend these thirty to forty-five
minute classes, and the local Counsel on Religious Education supplied the
religion instructors' salaries.'
Relying on its recent decision in Everson, the Court held that the Illinois

program was barred by the First Amendment. 8 ' The Court found the
released time program unconstitutional for two reasons.'82 First, the program
utilized tax-supported

public

school

facilities

to promote

religious

171. Id. at 31-32 (emphasis added).
172. See id. at 44-45.
173. Id. at 44 ("Does New Jersey's action furnish support for religion by use of the taxing power?
Certainly it does ... ").
174. Hoffman, supra note 12, at 1091.
175. Id.
176. Id. This "child benefit theory" holds that "government aid to religious institutions, such as
parochial schools, can be upheld on the ground that the children-and not the religious institutionsare the actual beneficiaries of the aid." Stiltner, supra note 158, at 829.
177. 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
178. McFarland, supra note 12, at 110 ("[T]he Establishment Clause did not play a major role in
the battle over state funding of religious schools until it was made applicable to the states, in
McCollum .... ").
179. 333 U.S. at 207-09.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 210 ("This is beyond all question a utilization of the tax-established and tax-supported
public school system to aid religious groups to spread their faith.").
182. ld. at209-10.
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education." 3 Second, the state's compulsory education system, which
required students to attend school, had the effect of mandating the religious
education under the program."'
In Zorach v. Clauson,5 the Supreme Court addressed another "released
time" program, but reached a startlingly different result. In Zorach,
taxpayers challenged New York's released time program which allowed its
public schools to "release students during the school day so that they may
leave the school buildings and school grounds and go to religious centers for
religious instructions and devotional exercises."'' 6 Writing for the Court,
Justice Douglas distinguished McCollum 7 and held that "we do not see how
New York by this type of 'released time' program has made a law respecting
an establishment of religion within the meaning of the First Amendment."'8
Although the Court in Zorach acknowledged the "constitutional
standard [of] the separation of Church and State,"'8 9 and took great care to
distinguish this released time program from that of Illinois in McCollum,"°
the absolutist language and tone had clearly changed.' 9' Rather, in Zorach
the Court emphasized that "[w]e are a religious people whose institutions
presuppose a Supreme Being.""'9 Furthermore, "[w]hen the state encourages
religious instruction or cooperates with religious authorities by adjusting the
schedule of public events to sectarian needs, it follows the best of our
traditions."'93 This was a marked shift from Everson and McCollum and
signaled that the Supreme Court's Establishment Clause doctrine was by no
means settled.
Board of Education v. Allen 4 presented the Court with a challenge to a
1965 New York statute that required school districts to purchase and loan
textbooks to students enrolled in parochial, private, and public schools.'95 In

183. Id. at 209.
184. Id. at 209-10.
185. 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
186. Id. at 308-09.
187. Id. ("This 'released time' program involves neither religious instruction in public school
classrooms nor the expenditure of public funds.").
188. Id. at 312.
189. Id. at 314.
190. See id. at 315 ("In the McCollum case the classrooms were used for religious instruction and
the force of the public school was used to promote that instruction.").
191. See id. at 312 ("The First Amendment... does not say that in every and all respects there
shall be a separation of Church and State."). But see id. at 317-18 (Black, J. dissenting) ("In
dissenting today, I mean to do more than give routine approval to our McCollum decision. I mean to
reaffirm my faith in the fundamental philosophy expressed in McCollum and Everson . .
192. Id. at 313.
193. Id. at 313-14.
194. 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
195. Id. at 238-39.
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approaching this question, the Court for the first time applied its "purpose
and effect" test.'" Justice White explained:
"The test may be stated as follows: what are the purpose and the
primary effect of the enactment? If either is the advancement or
inhibition of religion then the enactment exceeds the scope of
legislative power as circumscribed by the Constitution. That is to
say that to withstand the strictures of the Establishment Clause there
must be a secular legislative purpose97 and a primary effect that
neither advances nor inhibits religion."'
Applying this test, the Court found that the New York statute did not violate
the Constitution. " The Court reasoned that the parochial schools do not
receive the benefit of the free books, rather, the children do. 9 9 Moreover, the
books did not contain any religious content.2°° The Court in Allen also noted

the importance of private and parochial schools to the American educational
system,"° and the fact that "parochial schools are performing, in addition to
their sectarian function, the task of secular education."2 2
In Walz v. Tax Commission of the City of New York,293 the Court
considered the constitutionality of another New York statute, this time the
New York City Tax Commission's grant of "property tax exemptions to
religious organizations for religious properties used solely for religious

196. Id. at 243.
197. Id. (quoting Arbington Township Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963) (citation
omitted)).
198. Id. at 243-44. Justice White argued:
The express purpose of § 701 was stated by the New York Legislature to be furtherance
of the educational opportunities available to the young. Appellants have shown us
nothing about the necessary effects of the statute that is contrary to its stated purpose....
Perhaps free books make it more likely that some children choose to attend a sectarian
school, but that was true of the state-paid bus fairs in Everson and does not alone
demonstrate an unconstitutional degree of support for a religious institution.
Id.
199. Id. ("Books are furnished at the request of the pupil and ownership remains, at least
technically, in the State. Thus no funds or books are furnished to parochial schools, and the financial
benefit is to parents and children, not to schools.").
200. Id. at 244-45 ("[O]nly secular books may receive approval.").
201. Id. at 247 ("Underlying these cases, and underlying also the legislative judgements that have
preceded the court decisions, has been a recognition that private education has played and is playing
a significant and valuable role in raising national levels of knowledge, competence, and
experience.").
202. Id. at 248.
203. 397 U.S. 664 (1970).

worship."2" In finding that this tax exemption did not violate the First
Amendment, 5 the Court once again reexamined its Establishment and Free
Exercise jurisprudence.2" The Court admitted its struggles to come up with
a consistent and intelligible standard to govern this area of law,2" but

concluded that "neutrality" best appropriated the delicate balance between
government and religion.0 8 Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Burger
explained:
The general principle deducible from the First Amendment and all
that has been said by the Court is this: that we will not tolerate
either governmentally established religion or governmental
interference with religion. Short of those expressly proscribed
governmental acts there is room for play in the joints productive of
a benevolent neutrality which will permit religious exercise to exist
without sponsorship and without interference.2"
Despite its admitted struggles and confusion, the Court in Walz added a new
test to the purpose and effect test, "excessive entanglement."1' '

The Court

reasoned that the tax exemption program did not result in excessive
entanglement between church and state, but rather fostered greater
separation."

204. Id. at 666.
205. Id. at 680.
206. See id. at 668-72.
207. Id. Recognizing that "[t]he Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment
are not the most precisely drawn portions of the Constitution," Chief Justice Burger admitted:
In attempting to articulate the scope of the two Religion Clauses, the Court's opinions
reflect the limitations inherent in formulating general principles on a case-by-case basis.
The considerable internal inconsistency in the opinions of the Court derives from what, in
retrospect, may have been too sweeping utterances on aspects of these clauses that
seemed clear in relation to the particular cases but have limited meaning as general
principles.
Id. at 668.
208. Id. at 669-70 ("Adherence to the policy of neutrality that derives from an accommodation of
the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses has prevented the kind of involvement that would tip
the balance toward government control of churches or governmental restraint on religious
practice.").
209. Id. at 669.
210. Id. at 674 ("We must also be sure that the end result-the effect-is not an excessive
government entanglement with religion.").
211. Id. at 676 ("The exemption creates only a minimal and remote involvement between church
and state and far less than taxation of churches. It restricts the fiscal relationship between church
and state, and tends to complement and reinforce the desired separation insulating each from the
other.").
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2. Recent Supreme Court Jurisprudence: Lemon and its Progeny
In 1971, the Supreme Court ushered in the modem era of Establishment
Clause jurisprudence with its decision in Lemon v. Kurtzman.2 2
Lemon involved a challenge to Pennsylvania and Rhode Island statutory
programs that provided reimbursement and monetary supplements for
teacher salaries to non-public elementary schools.2 3 Under each program,
aid was given to church-affiliated schools.2 ' In Lemon, the Court combined
the three primary tests it had developed to analyze Establishment Clause
questions into one all-inclusive method of analysis.2 ' Chief Justice Burger
explained, "First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second,
its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits
religion; finally, the statute must not foster 'an excessive government
entanglement with religion."' 2 6
Under this new test, the Court found that both statutes had a secular
legislative purpose.27 The Court refrained from addressing the primary
effect test, because it concluded that there was excessive entanglement. 2 ' In
Lemon, the Court reiterated its evolving belief that "total separation is not
possible in an absolute sense." ' 9 But, under the excessive entanglement
inquiry, "[t]he objective is to prevent, as far as possible, the intrusion of
either into the precincts of the other." ' The statutes in question fostered an
excessive entanglement between schools with affirmatively religious
purposes,22' the teachers in those schools,222 and the state scrutiny necessary

212. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
213. Id. at 606-07.
214. Id. at 607.
215. Id. at 612-13.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 613 ("[T]he statutes ... clearly state that they are intended to enhance the quality of the
secular education in all schools covered by the compulsory attendance laws.").
218. Id. at 613-14.
219. Id. at 614.
220. Id. According to the Court, this inquiry involved the examination of "the character and
purposes of the institutions that are benefited, the nature of the aid that the State provides, and the
resulting relationship between the government and the religious authority." Id. at 615.
221. Id. at 616 ("[Plarochial schools involve substantial religious activity and purpose.").
222. Id. at 617. Chief Justice Burger distinguished the situation in Lemon from Allen:
We cannot ...refuse here to recognize that teachers have a substantially different
ideological character from books. In terms of potential for involving some aspects of
faith or morals in secular subjects, a textbook's content is ascertainable, but a teacher's
handling of a subject is not. We cannot ignore the danger that a teacher under religious
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to implement the programs." ' With the Lemon test, the Supreme Court
22

neutrality jurisprudence;
found a means of reconciling its separation and
225
apply.
however, the test has proven difficult to

A year after the Lemon decision, in Committee for Public Education &
Religious Liberty v. Nyquist,226 the Court addressed for the first time the
question of whether a state financial aid program violated the Establishment
Clause. In 1972, the State of New York enacted amendments to its

Education and Tax laws, implementing "financial aid programs for
nonpublic elementary and secondary schools.2, 27 The amendments included
money grants for maintenance and repair, student tuition reimbursement, and
parental tax relief.228 In addition, a substantial number of the schools
receiving aid were church-affiliated.220

The Court in Nyquist applied the Lemon three-part test and held that the
assistance provisions had the "primary effect" of advancing religion and thus
violated the Establishment Clause. 2" The Court did not question the secular

purpose of New York's education laws.23' However, it did address each of
the forms of aid in turn as to their "effect" on religion. 32 First, with regard
to the provisions for maintenance and repair, the Court found that they had a
"primary effect that advances religion" because the program did not include
any restrictions as to where and how the aid would be spent. 233 According to
the Court, such "subsidizing" of religious schools was unconstitutional.234

control and discipline poses to the separation of the religious from the purely secular
aspects of precollege education. The conflict of functions inheres in the situation.
Id.
223. Id. at 615-20. The Court noted that the Rhode Island program excludes teachers employed
by private schools "whose average per-pupil expenditures on secular education equal or exceed the
comparable figures for public schools." Id. at 620. This requires the government to periodically
examine the school's records. Id. The Court explained that, "[t]his kind of state inspection and
evaluation of the religious content of a religious organization is fraught with the sort of entanglement
that the Constitution forbids." Id.
224. Stiltner, supra note 158, at 831 ("The importance of Lemon was that it became the only
means adopted by the Court to reconcile and apply its conceptions of neutrality and separation.").
225. See id. at 836 ("Lemon as a workable standard has proven difficult.... No fewer than six of
the current members have criticized Lemon in whole or in part and have advocated significant
revision or abandonment of Lemon due to the problems that arise in its application.").
226. 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
227. Id. at 761-62.
228. Id. at 762-67.
229. Id. at 767-68.
230. Id. at 798.
231. Id. at 773 ("We do not question the propriety, and fully secular content, of New York's
interest in preserving a healthy and safe educational environment for all of its schoolchildren.").
232. Id. at 774-94.
233. Id. at 774 ("Nothing in the statute, for instance, bars a qualifying school from paying out of
state funds the salaries of employees who maintain the school chapel, or the cost of renovating
classrooms in which religion is taught, or the cost of heating and lighting those same facilities.").
234. Id. at 779-80 ("New York's maintenance and repair provisions violate the Establishment
Clause because their effect, inevitably, is to subsidize and advance the religious mission of sectarian
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Second, the Court began its analysis of the tuition reimbursement
provision23 by declaring unequivocally that in absence of sufficient
restrictions, "direct aid in whatever form is invalid." '36 The issue then for the
Court was "whether the fact that the grants are delivered to parents rather
'
than schools is of such significance as to compel a contrary result."237
The
Court distinguished Everson and Allen, noting that the beneficiaries in those
programs "included all schoolchildren, those in public as well as those in
'
private schools."238
The Court refrained, however, from closing off the
possibility of all types of tuition grant programs, with this now-infamous
footnote:239
Because of the manner in which we have resolved the tuition grant
issue, we need not decide whether the significantly religious
character of the statute's beneficiaries might differentiate the
present cases from a case involving some form of public assistance
(e.g., scholarships) made available generally without regard to the
sectarian-nonsectarian, or public-nonpublic nature of the institution
benefited." '

For the Court, there simply were not enough guarantees of neutrality and
separation in New York's program."
Rather, "it [was] precisely the
function of New York's law to provide assistance to private schools, the
great majority of which are sectarian. '' ' Thus, the Court concluded, "the
effect of the aid is unmistakably to provide desired financial support for

nonpublic, sectarian institutions. 2

3

Lastly, with regard to the primary effect

schools.").
235. Id. at 780. The provision provided direct, unrestricted grants of $50-$100 per child as
reimbursement to parents earning less than $5,000 in taxable income who sent their children to
nonpublic schools. Id.
236. Id. at 780.
237. Id. at 781. The State relied on Allen and Everson, which upheld grants which went directly
to parents rather than the schools. Id. But the Court explained, "the fact that aid is disbursed to
parents rather than to the schools is only one among many factors to be considered." Id.
238. Id. at 782 n.38.
239. Voucher proponents argue that this footnote opens the door to such neutrally based programs.
See supra note 69; see also infra text accompanying notes 441-42.
240. Id. at 782-83 n.38.
241. Id. at 783 ("There has been no endeavor 'to guarantee the separation between secular and
religious educational functions and to ensure the State financial aid supports only the former."'
(quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 613 (1971))).
242. Id.
243. Id. The Court also went on to note that the fact that the aid involved reimbursement, rather
than a subsidy or reward, was not of constitutional significance. ld. at 786-87.
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of the tax benefits to parents, the Court distinguished Walz, and found little
difference in impermissibility between the tax benefits and the tuition
reimbursement program.2"
During the middle of the 1970's, the Court issued two opinions that
attempted to draw boundary lines between constitutional, and
unconstitutional state aid to private schools based on the character of the aid
itself. In Meek v. Pittenger,245 the 'Court upheld part of a Pennsylvania
statute that lent textbooks to children attending nonpublic schools, but
invalidated the portion of the statute that provided "instructional materials,"
including "periodicals, photographs, maps, charts, sound recordings,
films.... projection equipment, recording equipment, and laboratory
equipment. 21 6 The Court found the textbook loan program almost identical
to that approved of in Board of Education v. Allen, in that the statute
"'merely makes available to all children the benefits of a general program to
lend school books free of charge.' 2 47 In contrast, the statute authorized the
loan of instructional materials "directly to qualifying nonpublic" schools. 8
Therefore, "the primary beneficiaries of [the) instructional material and
equipment loan provisions [were] nonpublic schools with a predominant
sectarian character. 21 9 The Court in Meek concluded that "indirect and
incidental benefits to church-related schools" did not violate the
Establishment Clause, but that "the massive aid provided the church-related
250
nonpublic schools of Pennsylvania.. . is neither indirect nor incidental."
Relying heavily on the reasoning in Meek, the Court in Wolman v.
Walter"' held that portions of an Ohio statutory scheme providing nonpublic
schools "with books, standardized testing and scoring, diagnostic services,
and therapeutic and remedial services" were constitutional, and that
"portions relating to instructional materials and equipment and field trip

244. Id. at 790-91 ("The qualifying parent under either program receives the same form of
encouragement and reward for sending his children to nonpublic schools.").
245. 421 U.S. 349 (1975).
246. Id. at 353-55.
247. id. at 362 (quoting Bd.of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 245 (1967)).
248. Id. at 362-63 (emphasis in original).
249. Id. at 364.
250. Id. at 364-65. Justice Stewart continued,
The very purpose of many of those schools is to provide an integrated secular and
religious education; the teaching process is, to a large extent, devoted to the inculcation
of religious values and belief. Substantial aid to the educational function of such schools,
accordingly, necessarily results in aid to the sectarian enterprise as a whole. "The secular
education those schools provide goes hand in hand with the religious mission that is the
only reason for the schools' existence. Within the institution, the two are inextricably
intertwined."
Id. at 366 (quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 657 (1971)) (internal citations omitted). This
"divertibility" argument is revived and explicitly rejected by the plurality in Mitchell v. Helms. See
infra text accompanying notes 342-47.
251. 433 U.S. 229 (1977).
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services" were unconstitutional. 2 The Court once again distinguished
between different types of aid by reference to the particular characteristics of
the aid itself.253 For example, the Court reasoned that "diagnostic services,
unlike teaching or counseling, have little or no educational content and are
not closely associated with the educational mission of the nonpublic
school."" 4 Ohio sought to avoid the strictures of Meek by emphasizing that
the materials and equipment were loaned to the student and parents.2"
However, the Court found this distinction would merely "exalt form over
substance" and that "[d]espite the technical change in legal bailee, the
program in substance is the same as before. 256

In 1983, the Court in Mueller v. Allen27 addressed a challenge to a
Minnesota income tax law which allowed state taxpayers to deduct costs for
tuition, textbooks and transportation. " Under Lemon, the Court held that
the state law did not violate the Establishment Clause.259 In an opinion
written by Justice Rehnquist, the Court began by finding that the Minnesota
statute had a secular purpose.26 Most notably, however, the Court found that
the statute "satisfie[d] the primary effect inquiry" for several reasons. 6 '
First, the deduction for educational expenses was one among many, such as
medical expenses and charitable contributions. 62

Second, "the deduction

[was] available for educational expenses incurred by" parents whose
children attended both public and private schools. 263 The Court noted that
the economic effect of the Minnesota program was "comparable to that of
aid given directly to the schools," but pointed out the distinction that "under
Minnesota's arrangement public funds become available only as a result of

252. Id. at 255.
253. Id. at 254-55.
254. Id. at 244.
255. See id. at 250.
256. Id. The Court analogized the issue to the tuition reimbursement program addressed in
Nyquist and found that "[i]f a grant in cash to parents is impermissible, we fail to see how a grant in
kind of goods furthering the religious enterprise can fare any better." Id. at 250-51.
257. 463 U.S. 388 (1983).
258. Id. at 390.
259. See id. at 402-03.
260. See id. at 395 ("A State's decision to defray the cost of educational expenses incurred by
parents-regardless of the type of schools their children attend-evidences a purpose that is both
secular and understandable.").
261. Id. at 402.
262. Id. at 396.
263. Id. at 397. In this respect, the Court distinguished the tax deductions from those in Nyquist.
Id. at 398 ("There, public assistance amounting to tuition grants was provided only to parents of
children in nonpublic schools."). But see id. at 411 ("This is a distinction without a difference.")
(Marshall, J., dissenting).

numerous private choices of individual parents of school-age children."":
Finally, the Court found that the statute passed the third Lemon prong,
because it did not "'excessively entangle' the State in religion." '65
Lynch v. Donnelly2 66 provided significant insight into the Establishment
Clause analysis because of Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion in which
she introduced her "endorsement" test.167 Lynch involved a challenge to a
Christmas nativity scene erected by the City of Pawtucket, Rhode Island.26s
The Court held that the city had not violated the Establishment Clause.269

Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Burger stated, "We are satisfied that
the city has a secular purpose for including the creche, that the city has not
impermissibly advanced religion, and that including the creche does not
create excessive entanglement between religion and government.""27 In her
concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor offered an amendment to the purpose
and effect prong of Lemon.27' She asserted, "The proper inquiry under the
purpose prong of Lemon, I submit, is whether the government intends to
27 For Justice
convey a message of endorsement or disapproval of religion.""
O'Connor, the impermissible effect of a government practice involved
''communicating a message of government endorsement or disapproval of
'
religion."273

In 1985, just when it seemed that Lemon was here to stay, the test
experienced a serious attack in Wallace v. Jaffree.274 The case involved
challenges to three Alabama statutes: one that allowed for a period of silence
in all public schools "'for meditation,"' another that authorized time for
"'meditation or voluntary prayer,"' and a third that allowed teachers to lead
students in prayer to "'Almighty God... the Creator and Supreme Judge of

264. Id. at 399 ("For these reasons, we recognized in Nyquist that the means by which state
assistance flows to private schools is of some importance ....
265. Id. at 403.
266. 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
267. See id. at 688-89 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("Focusing on institutional entanglement and on
endorsement or disapproval of religion clarifies the Lemon test as an analytical device."); see also
County of Allegheny v. Greater Pittsburgh Chapter of ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 626-27 (1989)
(O'Connor, J., concurring) (concluding that the "creche displayed on the Grand Staircase of the
Allegheny County Courthouse... has the unconstitutional 'effect of conveying a government
endorsement of Christianity.").
268. 465 U.S. at 671.
269. id. at 687.
270. Id. at 285.
271. See id. at 690 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
272. Id. at 691..
273. Id. at 692; see also Stiltner, supra note 158, at 841 ("After Lynch, the endorsement test
gained momentum as a viable alternative to Lemon.").
274. 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
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the world."' 275 Under Lemon, the Court held that the statutes violated the
Establishment Clause because they did not have a secular purpose."
In dissent, Justice Rehnquist took the opportunity to criticize the
Supreme Court's past and current doctrinal confusion regarding the
Establishment Clause.277
Justice Rehnquist specifically argued that
Everson's incorporation of the "wall of separation"2 5" and Lemon's three-part
test were "in no way based on either the language or intent of the drafters" of
the First Amendment.279 For Justice Rehnquist, the Court's difficulty in
reaching principled, consistent decisions reflects this doctrinal inaccuracy:
[A] State may lend to parochial school children geography
textbooks that contain maps of the United States, but the State may
not lend maps of the United States for use in geography class. A
State may lend textbooks on American colonial history, but it may
not lend a film on George Washington, or a film projector to show it
in history class. A State may lend classroom workbooks, but may
not lend workbooks in which the parochial school children write,
thus rendering them nonreusable. A State may pay for bus
.transportation to religious schools but may not pay for bus
transportation from the parochial school to the public zoo or natural
history museum for a field trip. A State may pay for diagnostic
services conducted in the parochial school but therapeutic services
must be given in a different building; speech and hearing "services"
conducted by the State inside the sectarian school are forbidden, but
the State may conduct speech and hearing diagnostic testing inside
the sectarian school. Exceptional parochial school students may
'receive counseling; but it must take place outside of the parochial
school, such as in a trailer parked down the street. A State may give
cash to a parochial school to pay for the administration of statewritten tests and state-ordered reporting services, but it may not
provide funds for teacher-prepared tests on secular subjects.
Religious instruction may not be given in public school, but the

275. Id. at 40 (quoting ALA. CODE §§ 16-1-20 to 20.2 (1984)).
276. Id. at 56 ("[T]he enactment.., was not motivated by any clearly secular purpose-indeed,
the statute had no secular purpose.").
277. See id. at 92 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); see also Bevilacqua, supra note 117, at 488.
278. Wallace, 472 U.S. at 91-92 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("It is impossible to build sound
constitutional doctrine upon a mistaken understanding of constitutional history, but unfortunately the
Establishment Clause has been expressly freighted with Jefferson's misleading metaphor for nearly
40 years.").
279. Id. at 108.

public school may release students during the day for religion
classes elsewhere, and may enforce attendance at those classes with
its truancy laws. 8°
Disgusted with Lemon and its "sisyphean task of trying to patch together
[its] blurred, indistinct and variable barrier," Justice Rehnquist proposed his
"original intent" test,28' which was based on his view that the "true meaning
of the Establishment Clause can only be seen in its history."2' 2 Although
Justice Rehnquist could not persuade other justices to join him, following
Wallace, and in the cases to follow, Everson's wall and Lemon's strictures
would become less absolute and impenetrable.
In Witters v. Washington Department of Services for the Blind,83 the
Court analyzed whether a blind student studying at a Christian college
seeking to become a pastor could apply for financial aid under the State of
Washington's vocational rehabilitation assistance program."l Under Lemon,
the Court found the assistance constitutional. 5
The Court in
Witters primarily focused on the "primary effect" test.286 Justice Marshall
began by noting that "[i]t is well settled that the Establishment Clause is not
violated every time money previously in the possession of a State is
'
conveyed to a religious institution."287
The Court found certain facts
determinative. First, the aid is "paid directly to the student.2 8 Second, any
aid that "ultimately flows to religious institutions does so only as a result of
the genuinely independent and private choices of aid recipients., 289 Third,
the program is available "'without regard to the sectarian-nonsectarian, or
public-nonpublic nature of the institution benefited.'"2' Fourth, it "creates no
financial incentive for students to undertake sectarian education. 2 9' Finally,
no "significant portion of the aid ... will end up flowing to religious
education. 292 The Court added that the Washington program did not result

280. Id. at 110-11 (citations omitted).
281. See Stiltner, supra note 158, at 839 ("Chief Justice Rehnquist believes Establishment Clause
jurisprudence should be approached from a proper understanding of the original intent of the First
Amendment.").
282. Wallace, 472 U.S. at 112-13 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
283. 474 U.S. 481 (1986).
284. Id. at 483.
285. Id. at 485-89.
286. Id. at 486-89. "[All parties concede the unmistakably secular purpose of the Washington
program." Id. at 485.
287. Id. at 486.
288. Id. at 487.
289. Id.
290. Id. (quoting Comm. for Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 782-83
n.38 (1973)).
291. Id. at 488 (citing Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 785-86).
292. Id.
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'
in the state "sponsoring or subsidizing religion."293
Moreover, it did not
2 '
"confer any message of state endorsement of religion.""
In County of Allegheny v. ACLU,2 95 the Court addressed another
challenge to the constitutionality of a creche placed outside the local county
courthouse.296 In contrast to Lynch, the majority found that the creche

violated the Establishment Clause because it resulted in an endorsement of
the Christian religion.2 97 Allegheny is most significant, however, because

Justice Kennedy proposed yet another method of Establishment Clause
analysis in his concurring opinion.2 98 Specifically, Justice Kennedy proposed
a "coercion" test, which asks whether the government remains a passive
participant or actually coerces religious participation.2
3 °°
In 1993, in Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School District,
the Court

moved further away from Lemon and towards a broader test of neutrality."'
In Zobrest, a deaf student requested that his Arizona school district provide
him with a sign language interpreter to accompany him to class at a Catholic

high school.32 Relying on precedent set in Mueller and Witters, rather than

Lemon, the Court held that the Establishment Clause did not bar the use of
the state-provided interpreter.3 3 Writing for the Court, Chief Justice
Rehnquist began by once again reaffirming the principle of "neutrality" in
these cases. 3" He then argued that the program was similar to the programs

293. Id.
294. Id. at 489.
295. 492 U.S. 573 (1989).
296. Id. at 579.
297. Id. at 601.
298. Id. at 655-56 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("I am content for present purposes to remain within
the Lemon framework, but do not wish to be seen as advocating, let alone adopting, that test as our
primary guide in this difficult area.").
299. Id. at 662 ("Absent coercion, the risk of infringement of religious liberty by passive or
symbolic accommodation is minimal.").
300. 509 U.S. 1 (1993).
301. See Stiltner, supra note 158, at 824. Stiltner comments:
While the Court did not explicitly overturn Lemon, the Court's silence as to Lemon
indicates that it is no longer the controlling test in Establishment Clause cases. The
Court's inability to agree on the proper standard to replace Lemon, however, serves only
to confuse further an already unpredictable area of law. No matter what test, if any,
emerges in the future, the Court in Zobrest affirmed its willingness to recognize
exceptions to the principles of neutrality and separation, as embodied in the "wall of
separation," by narrowly reaffirming the child benefit theory.
Id.
302. Zobrest, 509 U.S. at 3.
303. Id.
304. Id. at 8 ("[W]e have consistently held that government programs that neutrally provide
benefits to a broad class of citizens defined without reference to religion are not readily subject to an

upheld in Mueller and Witters, because its benefits were distributed
neutrally 5 and the "interpreter will be present in a sectarian school only as a
result of the private decision of individual parents."3 For these reasons, and
the fact that "children, not sectarian schools, are the primary beneficiaries"
of the program, the state was not "subsidiz[ing] the religious functions of the
parochial schools ....
In Agostini v. Felton,3°1 the Lemon test underwent an explicit

transformation. In 1985, the Supreme Court in Aguilar v. Felton held that
the Establishment Clause prevented the city of New York from "sending
public school teachers into parochial schools to provide remedial education
to disadvantaged children.''3' Twelve years later, the petitioners in
Aguilar sought relief from the injunction, arguing, based on subsequent
Establishment Clause jurisprudence, that Aguilar was no longer good law.3"'
The Court in Agostini held that Aguilar was inconsistent with current

Establishment Clause analysis. 31 ' First, the Court stated that it "abandoned
the presumption... that the placement of public employees on parochial
school grounds inevitably results in the impermissible effect of statesponsored indoctrination or constitutes a symbolic union between
government and religion. 3 2 Second, the Court noted that it had "departed
from the rule ...that all government aid that directly assists the educational

function of religious schools is invalid." ' Finally, the Court noted that the
"criteria by which an aid program identifies its beneficiaries" had evolved

Establishment Clause challenge just because sectarian institutions may also receive an attenuated
financial benefit.").
305. Id. at 10 ("The service at issue in this case is part of a general government program that
distributes benefits neutrally to any child qualifying as 'disabled' under the IDEA, without regard to
the 'sectarian-nonsectarian, or public-nonpublic nature' of the school the child attends.").
306. Id. ("[B]ecause the IDEA creates no financial incentive for parents to choose a sectarian
school, an interpreter's presence there cannot be attributed to state decisionmaking.").
307. Id. at 12 (quoting Sch. Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 397 (1985)). The Court
also distinguished a sign-language interpreter from a teacher, asserting that the interpreter "will
neither add to nor subtract from" the educational environment. Id. at 13. Furthermore, the Court
stated that "the Establishment Clause lays down no absolute bar to the placing of a public employee
in a sectarian school." Id.
308. 521 U.S. 203 (1997),
309. Id. at 208 (citing Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985)). The statute in question was Title I
of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, which channeled federal funds to local
school agencies. Id. at 209. The "funds must be made available to all eligible children, regardless of
whether they attend public" or private schools. Id.
310. Id. at 208-09. In Agostini, the Court reviewed Aguilar and its companion case, School
District of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985), and the underlying assumptions of those two
decisions. Id. at 218-20.
311. Id. at 237 ("We therefore conclude that our Establishment Clause law has 'significant[ly]
change[d] since we decided Aguilar.").
312. Id. at 223. The Court cited Zobrest for this conclusion. Id.
313. Id.at 225. The Court cited Witters for this conclusion. Id. The Court also observed that
Title I instruction would not impermissibly finance religious indoctrination. Id. at 228 ("No Title I
funds ever reach the coffers of religious schools.").
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from not only the concern for subsidizing religion, but also for creating a
"financial incentive to undertake religious indoctrination.

34

Writing for the

Court, Justice O'Connor explained that, "[tihis incentive is not present,
however, where the aid is allocated on the basis of neutral, secular criteria
that neither favor nor disfavor religion, and is made available to both
religious and secular beneficiaries on a nondiscriminatory basis."3 5
The most significant aspect of Agostini is its abandonment of "excessive
entanglement"

as

a

separate

test

under

Lemon-a more

current

understanding of "effect. '3 16 The new "effect" test asks whether the state
action "results in governmental indoctrination; define[s] its recipients by
reference to religion; or create[s] an excessive entanglement" with
religion.317

For many, Agostini signaled that the Supreme Court may be

shifting toward a more receptive stance with regard to interactions between
church and state.3 8
IV. MITCHELL V.

HELMS

319

A. Facts

In 1985, taxpayers brought an action challenging the constitutionality of
the Chapter 2 of the Education and Consolidation and Improvement Act of
1981.320 The Act provided aid in the form of instructional and educational
materials, library books, computer software and other curricular materials to
both private and public schools.32' Several restrictions applied to aid to
private

schools, including

that

such aid be "secular,

neutral, and

314. Id. at 230-31.
315. Id. at 231 ("Under such circumstances, the aid is less likely to have the effect of advancing
religion.").
316. Id. at 232 ("[T]he factors we use to assess whether an entanglement is 'excessive' are similar
to the factors we use to examine 'effect."'); see also Johnston, supra note 17, at 429 ("Perhaps the
most significant judicial impact of Agostini is the effect it has had on the Lemon Test.").
317. Id. at 234.
318. McCarthy, supra note 148, at 155 ("In light of Zobrest and Agostini, states are likely to enact
laws that provide additional public financial assistance to religious school students and to probe how
far they can go using the child-benefit justification."); see also Johnston, supra note 17, at 426
("Perhaps the most significant future impact of Agostini will be the role it plays in the ongoing
debate over private school vouchers.").
319. 530 U.S. 793 (2000).
320. Id. at 803-04.
321. Id. at 802.
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nonideological."3 2
In Jefferson Parish, Louisiana, approximately thirty
percent of Chapter 2 funds were allocated for private schools, a majority of
which were religiously affiliated.323
In December 1985, parents and teachers challenged the constitutionality
of Chapter 2 aid." ' For the next fifteen years, the validity of the program
would remain in doubt.32 In 1990, after extended discovery, Chief Judge
Heebe of the District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana held that
Chapter 2 violated the Establishment Clause.3"6 In 1994, after resolving
several other issues in the case, Judge Heebe issued an order permanently
enjoining sectarian schools in Jefferson Parish from receiving any Chapter 2
aid. 27 After Chief Judge Heebe retired, Judge Livaudais received the case,
and in 1997, ruling on postjudgment motions, reversed Judge Heebe's
decision and upheld the Chapter 2 aid.328 On appeal, the Fifth Circuit

reversed, 9 and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.33 When the Supreme
Court agreed to hear the case, many commentators noted that the result in
Mitchell could very likely signal the eventual success or failure of school

voucher programs in the United States. 3

B. The PluralityOpinion by Justice Thomas

Justice Thomas began the plurality opinion by recognizing that although
the Court had in the past struggled with its interpretation of the
Establishment Clause, it had recently "brought some clarity to our case law"

322. Id.
323. Id. at 803.
324. Id. at 803-04.
325. Id. at 804-07. Justice Thomas commented, "The case's tortuous history over the next 15
years indicates well the degree to which our Establishment Clause jurisprudence has shifted in recent
times, while nevertheless retaining anomalies with which the lower courts have had to struggle." Id.
at 804.
326. Helms v. Cody, No. CIV. A. 85-5533, 1990 WL 36124, at *1 (E.D. La. Mar. 27, 1990).
327. Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 804.
328. Helms v. Cody, No. CIV. A. 85-5533, 1997 WL 35283, at *20 (E.D. La. Jan. 28, 1997). In
reversing the decision, Judge Livaudais relied primarily on the Ninth Circuit's decision in Walker v.
San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist., 46 F.3d 1449 (1995) which upheld Chapter 2 aid on similar facts,
and the Supreme Court's decisions in Zobrest and Rosenberger.
329. Helms v. Picard, 151 F.3d 347 (5th Cir. 1998) (holding use of federal funds to provide
computers and other instructional equipment a violation of Establishment Clause), cert. granted sub
nom., Mitchell v. Helms, 527 U.S. 1002 (1999).
330. Mitchell v. Helms, 527 U.S. 1002 (1999).
331. Maureen E. Cusack, The Unconstitutionalityof School Voucher Programs:The United States
Supreme Court's Chance to Revive or Revise Establishment Clause Jurisprudence, 33 COLUM. J.L.
& SOC. PROBS. 85, 88 (1999) ("Because the issue of providing federal financial assistance to private
schools closely relates to the constitutionality of school voucher programs, the Court's final
determination of [Mitchell] will be important for Establishment Clause jurisprudence and the future
of school vouchers.").

[Vol. 29: 343, 2002]

Mitchell v. Helms
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

under the "revised test" of Agostini.332 Justice Thomas explained that "in
Agostini we modified Lemon for purposes of evaluating aid to schools and
examined only the first and second factors," whether a statute has a secular
purpose, and whether it has a primary effect of advancing or inhibiting
religion.333 Because the secular purpose of Chapter 2 was not challenged,
Justice Thomas noted that the Court would limit its consideration to the
statute's effect.33 Moreover, only the first two prongs of the Agostini effect
test were at issue. 335

The first question under the Agostini "effect" prong was "whether
governmental aid to religious schools results in governmental
and specifically "whether any religious indoctrination that
indoctrination,
occurs in those schools could reasonably be attributed to governmental
'
In analyzing this issue, Justice Thomas noted that the Court has
action."337
"consistently turned to the principle of neutrality. 338 Justice Thomas
explained that "[i]f the religious, irreligious, and areligious are all alike
eligible for governmental aid, no one would conclude that any indoctrination
that any particular recipient conducts has been done at the behest of the
'
As a means of "assuring neutrality," the Court looks to
government."339
"whether any governmental aid that goes to a religious institution does so
'only as a result of the genuinely independent and private choices of
individuals.' 310 Justice Thomas reasoned that "if numerous private choices,
rather than the single choice of a government, determine the distribution of
aid pursuant to neutral eligibility criteria, then a government cannot, or at
least cannot easily, grant special favors that might lead to a religious
establishment. ' ' 1

332. Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 807.
333. Id.
334. Id. at 808.
335. Id. ("[N]either respondents nor the Fifth Circuit has questioned the District Court's holding
that Chapter 2 does not create an excessive entanglement." (citation omitted)).
336. Id. at 809.
337. Id.
338. Id.
339. Id. Justice Thomas continued:
To put the point differently, if the government, seeking to further some legitimate secular
purpose, offers aid on the same terms, without regard to religion, to all who adequately
further that purpose, then it is fair to say that any aid going to a religious recipient only
has the effect of furthering that secular purpose.
Id. at 810 (citation omitted).
340. Id. at 810 (quoting Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 226 (1997)).
341. ld.

Justice Thomas next addressed the second Agostini question, "whether

an aid program 'define[s] its recipients by reference to religion.',3 2 He
noted that this inquiry includes neutrality, but also encompasses the question
of "whether the criteria for allocating the aid 'creat[e] a financial incentive
to undertake religious indoctrination.

-'34

In Agostini, the Court held that

"'[t]his incentive is not present, however, where the aid is allocated on the
basis of neutral, secular criteria that neither favor nor disfavor religion, and
is made available to both religious and secular beneficiaries on a
nondiscriminatory basis.'

''

Justice Thomas also explained that "simply

because an aid program offers private schools, and thus religious schools, a
benefit that they did not previously receive does not mean that the
program...

creates ...

an 'incentive' for parents to choose such an

'
education for their children. For any aid will have some such effect."345
Justice Thomas next rejected respondents' two primary arguments,
namely, that "'direct, nonincidental' aid to the primary educational mission
of religious schools is always impermissible," and that "provision to
religious schools of aid that is divertible to religious use is similarly

impermissible."

"

According to Justice Thomas, the indirect/direct aid

distinction is now determined by the principle of private choice. 47

He

reasoned, "If aid to schools, even 'direct aid,' is neutrally available and,

before reaching or benefiting any religious school, first passes through the
hands (literally or figuratively) of numerous private citizens who are free to
direct the aid elsewhere, the government has not provided any 'support of
religion.'-

34

With regard to the divertibility of aid, Justice Thomas declared:

342. Id. at 813 (quoting Agostini, 521 U.S. at 234).
343. Id. (quotingAgostini, 521 U.S. at 231).
344. Id.
345. Id. at 814 (citing Bd. of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 244 (1968), Everson v. Bd. of Educ.,
330 U.S. 1, 17 (1947), and Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 399 (1983)).
346. Id. at 814-15. "Respondents' arguments are inconsistent with our more recent case law, in
particular Agostini and Zobrest, and we therefore reject them." Id. at 815.
347. Id. at 815-16 ("Although some of our earlier cases ... emphasize the distinction between
direct and indirect aid, the purpose of this distinction was merely to prevent 'subsidization' of
religion.... [Olur more recent cases address this purpose not through the direct/indirect distinction
but rather through the principle of private choice."). Justice Thomas distinguished and rejected the
"formalism" developed in Meek and Wolman, which required that "any direct aid be literally placed
in the hands of schoolchildren." Id. at 817. "That Meek and Wolman reached the same result, on
programs that were indistinguishable but for the direct/indirect distinction, shows that that
distinction played no part in Meek." Id. at 818. The Court in fact specifically overruled both Meek
and Wolman, acknowledging "what has long been evident," that such formal distinctions are no
longer valid under current precedent. Id. at 835-36.
348. Id. at 816 (citing Witters v. Wash. Dept. of Services for Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 489 (1986)).
Justice Thomas recognized that "we have seen 'special Establishment Clause dangers' when money
is given to religious schools or entities directly rather than ...indirectly." Id. at 818-19 (quoting
Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 842 (1995)). Such payments were
not at issue in Mitchell, and Justice Thomas "refuseld] to allow a 'special' case to create a rule for all
cases." Id. at 820. In a subsequent footnote, however, Justice Thomas posited,
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So long as the governmental aid is not itself "unsuitable for use in
the public schools because of religious content," . . . and eligibility
for aid is determined in a constitutionally permissible manner, any
use of that aid to indoctrinate cannot be attributed to the government
and is thus not of constitutional concern. 9
For Justice Thomas and the plurality, the divertibility argument was a
is0
distinction without any reasoned basis because in actuality "any aid... 35
'divertible' in the sense that it allows schools to 'divert' resources."
Accordingly, the focus should not be the divertibility35 of the aid, but rather
"whether the aid itself has an impermissible content., '
Finally, Justice Thomas addressed the dissent's arguments,352 but only
dealt with one concern in depth: "whether a school that receives aid (or
whose students receive aid) is pervasively sectarian. 3 3 Justice Thomas gave
four reasons why this factor no longer is of any constitutional concern.35'
First, it is no longer a factor in the Court's precedents.355 Second, the
"religious nature of a recipient should not matter to the constitutional
analysis, so long as the recipient adequately furthers the government's
secular purpose. 3 6 Third, the "inquiry into the recipient's religious views
required by a focus on whether a school is pervasively sectarian is not only
'
Finally, Justice Thomas asserted that
unnecessary but also offensive."357
"hostility to aid to pervasively sectarian schools has a shameful pedigree that
we do not hesitate to disavow. 358

It is arguable ... at least after Witters, that the principles of neutrality and private choice
would be adequate to address those special risks, for it is hard to see the basis for
deciding Witters differently simply if the State had sent the tuition check directly to
whichever school Witters chose to attend.
Id. at 820 n.8. For discussion of this footnote and its implication for future of the Cleveland
Voucher Program see infra Part V.
349. Id. at 820 (quoting Allen, 392 U.S. at 245).
350. Id. at 824.
351. Id. at 822 ("Where the aid would be suitable for use in a public school, it is also suitable for
use in any private school.").
352. Justice Thomas discarded the dissent's "11 factor" test, which he regarded as chaotic and
"clouded." Id. at 825-26.
353. Id. at 826.
354. Id. ("There are numerous reasons to formally dispense with this factor.").
355. Id.
356. Id. at 827 ("If a program offers permissible aid to the religious (including the pervasively
sectarian), the areligious, and the irreligious, it is a mystery which view of religion the government
has established, and thus a mystery what the constitutional violation would be.").
357. Id. at 828 ("It is well established, in numerous other contexts, that courts should refrain from
trolling through a person's or institution's religious beliefs.").
358. Id.

Turning to the facts presented, Justice Thomas in Mitchell found that
there is "no basis for concluding that Jefferson Parish's Chapter 2 program
3 9 First, Chapter
'has the effect of advancing religion.""'
2 does not define its
recipients with reference to religion." Rather, "[a]id is allocated based on
enrollment. 3 61 Second, Chapter 2 does not result in governmental
indoctrination.362 Justice Thomas noted that "[t]he program makes a broad
array of schools eligible for aid without regard to their religious affiliations
or lack thereof. 3 63

Accordingly, Chapter 2 is "neutral with regard to

religion."3 Third, students and parents, not the government, determine
which school receives Chapter 2 funds. 65 As Justice Thomas put it: "The aid
follows the child." 3" Fourth, although the aid is direct, it is "provided
pursuant to private choices. 3 6' Fifth, the aid is not of an impermissible
content. 6' Lastly, although there is evidence of diversion, it is "not relevant
3 9 According
to the constitutional inquiry.""
to Justice Thomas, and the
plurality, Chapter 2 satisfied the Agostini criterion, and "therefore [did] not
3
have the effect of advancing religion.""
C. Justice O'Connor's ConcurringOpinion

Justice O'Connor agreed with much of the plurality opinion, but voiced
' For
two concerns.37"' The first was the plurality's treatment of "neutrality."372
359. Id. at 829 (quoting Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 234 (1997)).
360. Id. ("[lit is clear that Chapter 2 aid 'is allocated on the basis of neutral, secular criteria that
neither favor nor disfavor religion, and is made available to both religious and secular beneficiaries
on a nondiscriminatory basis."').
361. Id.
362. Id. at 830.
363. Id.
364. Id.
365. Id. "Chapter 2 aid.., like the aid in Agostini, Zobrest, and Witters, reaches participating
schools only 'as a consequence of private decisionmaking."' Id. (quoting Agostini v. Felton, 521
U.S. 203, 222 (1997)).
366. Id.
367. Id. at 831 ("The ultimate beneficiaries of Chapter 2 aid are the students who attend the
schools that receive that aid ....).
368. Id. ("The chief aid at issue is computers, computer software, and library books.").
369. Id. at 833-34.
370. Id. at 835. Justice Thomas went on to note that "Chapter 2 also 'cannot reasonably be
viewed as an endorsement of religion ....
' Id. (quoting Agostini, 521 U.S. at 235).
371. Id. at 837 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("I write separately because, in my view, the plurality
announces a rule of unprecedented breadth for the evaluation of Establishment Clause challenges to
governmental school-aid programs.").
372. Id. at 838-39. Justice O'Connor explained:
I do not quarrel with the plurality's recognition that neutrality is an important reason for
upholding government-aid programs against Establishment Clause challenges....
Nevertheless, we have never held that a government-aid program passes constitutional
muster solely because of the neutral criteria it employs as a basis for distributing aid.
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Justice O'Connor, neutrality is an important factor, but it is merely one
73
3
among many factors to consider in the Establishment Clause analysis.
Thus, Justice O'Connor agreed with Justice Souter "that our 'most recent
use of "neutrality" to refer to generality or evenhandedness of
distribution... is relevant in judging whether a benefit scheme so
characterized should be seen as aiding a sectarian school's religious mission,
but this neutrality is not alone sufficient to qualify the aid as
constitutional. '374
In addition, Justice
O'Connor questioned the plurality's rejection of
37
"actual diversion.""
She disagreed with the conclusion that "actual
diversion of government aid to religious indoctrination is consistent with the
Establishment Clause. 3 76 The key distinction with regard to divertibility for
Justice O'Connor is between a neutral per-capita-aid program (in Mitchell)
and a true private choice program (as in Witters and Zobrest).377 She
observed, "[like Justice Souter, I do not believe that we should treat a percapita-aid program the same as the true private-choice programs considered
in Witters and Zobrest."37 Justice O'Connor gave three reasons for this
view: first, the fact that the aid goes directly to the student beneficiary means
that the student can control whether or not the aid is applied toward religious
education;3 79

second,

the distinction

is

important

for

purposes

of

"endorsement";... and third, the distinction is critical when "considering aid

Id. at 838.
373. Id. at 839.
374. Id. at 840 (quoting Id. at 883-84 (Souter, J., dissenting)).
375. Id.
376. Id. ("[O]ur decisions 'provide no precedent for the use of public funds to finance religious
activities."' (quoting Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 847 (1995))).
377. Id. at 842. With regard to this distinction, professor Michael McConnell, who represented
the petitioner in Mitchell, has noted:
Perhaps the most striking feature of the concurring opinion was its agreement with the
plurality regarding the constitutionality of what they called "true private-choice
programs," without the need for secular use restrictions. These are programs, like
vouchers, in which "the aid was provided directly to the individual student who, in turn,
made the choice of where to put that aid to use....
This may be the most significant
aspect of the entire Mitchell litigation ....
McConnell, supra note 21, at 696.
378. Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 842. Justice O'Connor emphasized that the approval of the aid in
Witters and Zobrest was highly conditioned on the fact that the aid was provided directly to the
individual student. Id. at 841. "This characteristic of both programs made them less like a direct
subsidy, which would be impermissible under the Establishment Clause, and more akin to the
government issuing a paycheck to an employee who, in turn, donates a portion of that check to a
religious institution." Id.
379. Id.
380. Id. at 842-43 ("In terms of public perception, a government program of direct aid to religious

that consists of direct monetary subsidies."38 ' For Justice O'Connor, direct

money subsidies are clearly impermissible, and the plurality's broad
neutrality language comes close to discarding the Court's reliance on the
other significant factors outlined in Agostini.382

Justice O'Connor next considered the specific Agostini factors. She
explained that "it is clear that Chapter 2 does not define aid recipients by
reference to religion."3' 3 With regard to governmental indoctrination, Justice
O'Connor stated that the "Chapter 2 program at issue here bears the same
hallmarks of the New York City Title I program that we found important in
Agostini.3' " First, Justice O'Connor noted that Chapter 2 aid is "distributed

on the basis of neutral, secular criteria.""38 Second, Chapter 2 funds are only
supplemental.386 For Justice O'Connor, Chapter 2 funds must in no case be
used to supplant the funds otherwise available to a religious school.387 Third,

it is critical to Justice O'Connor that "no Chapter 2 funds ever reach the
coffers of a religious school.""38 Finally, Chapter 2 materials must be
"secular, neutral, and nonideological."' 3
Justice

O'Connor

rejected

respondents'

attempts

to

distinguish

Agostini.a9 In addition, she disagreed with both the plurality and the dissent
on the adequacy of the statutory safeguards to prevent divertibility of aid.39'
schools based on the number of students attending each school differs meaningfully from the
government distributing aid directly to individual students who, in turn, decide to use the aid at the
same religious school.").
381. Id. at 843-44. Justice O'Connor noted:
If, as the plurality contends, a per-capita-aid program is identical in relevant
constitutional respects to a true private-choice program, then there is no reason that,
under the plurality's reasoning, the government should be precluded from providing
direct money payments to religious organizations (including churches) based on the
number of persons belonging to each organization.
Id.
382. Id. at 844 ("For these reasons, as well as my disagreement with the plurality's approach, I
would decide today's case by applying the criteria set forth in Agostini.").
383. Id. at 845.
384. Id. at 848. The factors the Court found important in Agostini include the following:
[T]he aid was "provided to students at whatever school they chose to attend," the services
were "by law supplemental to the regular curricula" of the benefitted schools, "no Title I
funds ever reach the coffers of religious schools," and there was no evidence of Title I
instructors having "attempted to inculcate religion in students."
Id. (quoting Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 226-28 (1997)).
385. Id.
386. Id.
387. Id.
388. Id.
389. Id. at 849 (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 7372(a)(1)).
390. Id. at 849-60. O'Connor also rejected respondents' and Justice Souter's reliance on a
divertibility argument derived from Meek and Wolman, noting that such a theory "does not provide a
logical distinction between the lending of textbooks and the lending of instructional materials and
equipment. An educator can use virtually any instructional tool, whether it has ascertainable content
or not, to teach a religious message." Id. at 852-55.
391. Id. at 861. The plurality avoids the safeguard issue by contending that actual divertibility is
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Justice O'Connor argued that safeguards are relevant to the discussion, but
in the present case, were sufficient to pass the constitutional muster.392
Accordingly, Justice O'Connor concluded that the Chapter 2 program was
sufficiently similar to the Title I aid in Agostini to survive the Establishment
Clause challenge.9
D. The Dissenting Opinion by Justice Souter

In dissent, Justice Souter asserted that "the plurality opinion...
espouses a new conception of neutrality as a practically sufficient test of
constitutionality that would, if adopted by the Court, eliminate enquiry into a
'
law's effects."394
His dissent therefore began with a review of the history
and philosophy of the Establishment Clause.395

According to Souter, the

Establishment Clause represented three fundamental concerns: (1) freedom
of conscience;396 (2) government aid corrupts religion; 97 and (3) government
establishment of religion is linked with conflict. 8

permissible, and the dissent argues that the safeguards are insufficient. Id. For Justice O'Connor,
proof that aid has been used for religious purposes would be sufficient to establish a First
Amendment violation, however, "inculcation of religion" should not be presumed. Id. at 857-60.
Moreover, although teachers "need [to] ensure that any such religious teaching is done without the
instructional aids provided by the government," O'Connor rejected a presumption that religious
school teachers do not adhere to secular restrictions on aid. Id. at 859.
392. Id. at 861 ("The safeguards employed by the program are constitutionally sufficient.").
Furthermore, it is "entirely proper to presume that these school officials will act in good faith." Id.
at 863-64. Justice O'Connor also rejected Justice Souter's argument that "any evidence" of actual
diversion requires the Court to declare the program unconstitutional. Id. at 865-66.
393. Id. at 867. Illustrating these similarities, Justice O'Connor stated:
As in Agostini, the Chapter 2 aid is allocated on the basis of neutral, secular criteria; the
aid must be supplementary and cannot supplant non-Federal funds; no Chapter 2 funds
ever reach the coffers of religious schools; the aid must be secular; any evidence of actual
diversion is de minimus; and the program includes adequate safeguards.
Id.
394. Id. at 869 (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Souter explained:
[Tihe Court has isolated no single test of constitutional sufficiency, and the question in
every case addresses the substantive principle of no aid: what reasons are there to
characterize this benefit as aid to the sectarian school in discharging its religious missioh?
Particular factual circumstances control, and the answer is a matter of judgment.
Id.
395. Id. at 868-72.
396. Id. at 870 ("Madison's and Jefferson's now familiar words establish clearly that liberty of
personal conviction requires freedom from coercion to support religion, and this means that the
government can compel no aid to fund it." (citing Jefferson's Billfor Religious Freedom, supra text
accompanying note 134)).
397. Id. at 871 (citing Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 431 (1962)). Justice Souter stated that
"Madison argued that establishment of religion weakened the beliefs of adherents so favored,
strengthened their opponents, and generated 'pride and indolence in the Clergy; ignorance and

Justice Souter next canvassed the Supreme Court's Establishment
Clause jurisprudence.399

Emerging from over half a century of Supreme

Court effort was the principle of "neutrality." 4" According to Justice Souter,
however, the concept of neutrality has undergone a marked transformation in
recent years.40 ' Neutrality as originally posited in such cases as Everson was
merely a "label for the required relationship between the government and
religion as a state of equipoise between government as ally and government
4 2
and adversary.""

However, the current conceptions of neutrality, as in

Agostini, "recast neutrality as a concept of 'evenhandedness.' 43 Under the
original conception, "neutrality was tantamount to constitutionality," but
under the current definition "neutrality is not alone sufficient to qualify the
aid as constitutional."° Rather, there must be other necessary lines of
enquiry."'

The first category addresses the "types of school aid recipients .,0° In
"pervasively sectarian" schools the religious mission is "not confined to a
discrete element of the curriculum."4 7 In addition, according to Justice
Souter, special concerns exist with regard to aid to primary and secondary
religious schools because "the youth of the students in such schools makes
them highly susceptible to religious indoctrination," and because "the
religious element in the education offered in most sectarian primary and
secondary schools is far more intertwined with the secular than in university
teaching, where the natural and academic skepticism of most older students
may separate the two."4 0

servility in the laity; [and] in both, superstition, bigotry and persecution."' Id. (quoting Madison's
Memorial and Remonstrance,supra text accompanying note 137).
398. Id. at 872 (citing Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 8-11 (1947)). "In our own history, the
turmoil thus produced has led to a rejection of the idea that government should subsidize religious
education." Id. (citing Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 645-49 (1971) (Brennan, J., concurring)).
399. Id. at 873-78.
400. Id. at 878-84.
401. Id.
402. Id. at 882-83.
403. Id. at 883.
404. Id. at 883-84. Justice Souter explained:
[I]f
we looked no further than evenhandedness, and failed to ask what activities the aid
might support, or in fact did support, religious schools could be blessed with government
funding as massive as expenditures made for the benefit of their public school
counterparts, and religious missions would thrive on public money.
Id. at 885.
405. Id. at 885. Justice Souter noted that "three main lines of enquiry.., have emerged to
complement evenhandedness neutrality." Id.
406. Id.
407. Id. at 886.
408. Id. at 887 ("[G]overnment benefits accruing to these pervasively religious primary and
secondary schools raise special dangers of diversion into support for the religious indoctrination of
children and the involvement of government in religious training and practice.").
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The second important category to consider is the "method by which aid
is granted. '' "9 Justice Souter challenged the plurality's abandonment of the
direct/indirect distinction.4
He argued that the Court should distinguish
between "incidental[]" indirect aid that reaches schools through private
choices and aid "directed to religious schools by the government.... 4 ',
Lastly, the Court must consider the features of the aid itself.42 Aid with
13
actual religious content is clearly barred."
Similarly, "divertible" aid is also
44
invalid.
For Justice Souter, "supplementary" aid in some instances is
allowable, but aid that "supplants expenditures" for religious schools cannot
pass constitutional muster. 5
"Substantial amounts" of aid are also
unconstitutional." 6 Justice Souter explained, "together with James Madison
we have consistently understood the Establishment Clause to impose a
substantive prohibition against public aid to religion and, hence, to the
religious mission of sectarian schools." 7 According to Justice Souter, "[tlhe
substance of the law has ... not changed since Everson."'

For Justice Souter and the dissent, the most relevant facts in Mitchell
were the divertibility and actual diversion of the aid." 9 Justice Souter argued

409. Id. at 888.
410. Id. at 488 n.8 ("The plurality misreads our precedent in suggesting that we have abandoned
directness of distribution as a relevant consideration.").
411. Id. at 889.
412. Id. at 889-90.
413. Id. at 890-91.
414. Id. at 890-95. "I reject the plurality's argument that divertibility is a boundless principle."
Id. at 894 n. 13.
415. Id. at 896.
416. Id. at 898.
417. Id. at 899.
418. Id. at 899. "The plurality's mistaken assumptions explain and underscore its sharp break
with the Framers' understanding of establishment and this Court's consistent interpretative course."
Id. at 902. It is in this area that the dissent challenged the plurality's most basic assumptions
regarding the Establishment Clause. Justice Souter continued, "As a break with consistent doctrine
the plurality's new criterion is unequaled in the history of Establishment Clause interpretation.
Simple on its face, it appears to take evenhandedness neutrality and in practical terms promote it to a
single and sufficient test for the establishment constitutionality of school aid." Id. at 900. Justice
Souter also addressed the "mistaken assumptions" of the plurality. Id. First, Justice Souter criticized
the plurality for using an "external observer's attribution of religious support to the government as
the sole" criterion for measuring a statute's impermissible effect. Id. Second, according to Justice
Souter, there is no reason to assume that "equal amounts of aid to religious and nonreligious schools
will have exclusively secular and equal effects, on both external perception and on incentives to
attend different schools." Id. at 901. Lastly, Justice Souter argued that the plurality's assumption
that "per capita distribution rules safeguard the same principles as independent, private choices" is
simply false. Id. at 902.
419. Id. at 902-03.

393

that Chapter 2 aid was "highly" divertible.42 ° Moreover, the program's
"
' In fact, evidence suggested that
design contained insufficient safeguards.42
the aid had been diverted to religious purposes. 422 Based on such findings,
that the program as applied violated
"[t]he Court ha[d] no choice
4 2 but to hold
the Establishment Clause. 1
V.

THE CLEVELAND VOUCHER PROGRAM AND MITCHELL V. HELMS

Under Mitchell, the Cleveland Voucher Program stands a fighting
chance of passing constitutional muster. The program clearly has a secular
purpose: to improve the educational opportunities of low-income inner-city
youth. 2' Also, the Cleveland Program is not likely to create an excessive
entanglement with religion under Agostini's "effect" test.25 As in Mitchell,

the real issues are likely to be whether the Cleveland Program results in
government indoctrination or defines its recipients by reference to religion." 6
The latter of these questions should not pose a problem, however, because in
by
lot. 27'
Program
recipients
are
chosen
the
Cleveland
Thus, the Program's constitutionality will likely turn on the Court's
treatment of indoctrination.
Under the plurality's test in Mitchell (which finds no indoctrination if
eligibility for aid is determined according to neutral criteria, allocation of the
aid is based on the private choices of the parents of the schoolchildren, and if
the aid is not of an impermissible content), the Cleveland Program should be
found constitutional. In the Cleveland Program, eligibility for aid is based
on family income;4

8

scholarship checks are payable to the parents of the

420. Id. at 903.
421. Id. at 906 ("The plurality has already noted at length the ineffectiveness of the government's
monitoring program.").
422. Id. at 909.
423. Id. at 910.
424. Simmons-Harris v. Zelman, 72 F. Supp. 2d 834, 847 (N.D. Ohio 1999).
' 425. As Justice O'Connor noted in Agostini v. Felton, "[e]ntanglement must be 'excessive' before
it runs afoul of the Establishment Clause." 521 U.S. 203, 233 (1997).
426. See supra text accompanying notes 335-36; see also Simmons-Harris v. Zelman, 234 F.3d
945; 968 (6th Cir. 2000) (Ryan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) ("This court's first duty...
is to proceed to examine the first two criteria from Agostini's 'impermissible effect' test to determine
whether the effect of Ohio's voucher program is to advance religion .... ").
427. Simmons-Harris, 72 F. Supp. 2d at 836. As Justice Thomas explained in Mitchell, this
inquiry also asks "whether the criteria for allocating the aid 'creat[e] a financial incentive to
undertake religious indoctrination."' Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 813 (quoting Agostini, 521 U.S. at 231).
However, "simply because an aid program offers private schools, and thus religious schools, a
benefit that they did not previously receive does not mean that the program ... creates.., an
'incentive' for parents to choose such an education for their children." Id. at 814.
428. Simmons-Harris v. Zelman, 234 F.3d at 948 ("The program requires participating private
schools to cap tuition at $2500 per student per year and pays 90% of whatever tuition the school
actually charges for low-income families; for other families the State pays 75% of the school's
tuition up to a maximum of $1875.") (citing OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3313.979(A)(8) (West 2001);
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student, who "endorse the checks over to the school" they choose for their

child to attend; 20 and the aid itself (i.e., money) possesses no religious
content. However, will the fact that the type of aid in question is money,
instead of educational supplies, effect the Court's analysis?43

Justice Thomas, in Mitchell, hinted that the private choice principle may
be appropriate to deal with the "'special Establishment Clause dangers'
when money is given to religious schools or entities directly rather than...
indirectly."43' Justice Thomas noted that "[t]he reason for such concern is
not that the form per se is bad, but that such a form creates special risks that
governmental aid will have the effect of advancing religion .... An indirect
form of payment reduces these risks." '3 2 Thus, indirect payments to parents

in the form of a voucher or scholarship, which are wholly dependent upon
the parents' choice about where to spend the money, should not offend the

Court's primary concern of "whether any religious indoctrination that occurs
'
in those schools could reasonably be attributed to governmental action."433

Justice Thomas explained:
[A]ttribution of indoctrination is a relative question. If the
government is offering assistance to recipients who provide, so to
speak, a broad range of indoctrination, the government itself is not
thought responsible for any particular indoctrination. To put the
point differently, if the government, seeking to further some
legitimate secular purpose, offers aid on the same terms, without

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3313.978(A) (West 2001), amended by 2001 Ohio Laws 13).
429. Id. (citing OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3313.979 (West 2001)).
430. The fact that is aid is question is money proved extremely divisive and critical to the Sixth
Circuit's decision. Writing for the majority, Judge Clay asserted that "[tihere is no neutral aid when
that aid principally flows to religious institutions; nor is there truly 'private choice' when the
available choices resulting from the program design are predominantly religious." Id. at 961. In
contrast, Judge Ryan in dissent claimed that "[tihe rule is now settled that a government program
that permits financial aid ultimately to reach religious schools does not offend the Establishment
Clause is the government's role in the program is neutral." Id. at 971-72 (Ryan, J., concurring in
part, dissenting in part).
431. Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 818-19 (citation omitted) (quoting Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of
Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 842 (1995)). Justice Thomas continued,
It is arguable... at least after Witters, that the principles of neutrality and private choice
would be adequate to address those special risks, for it is hard to see the basis for
deciding Witters differently simply if the State had sent the tuition check directly to
whichever school Witters chose to attend.
Id. at 820 n.8.
432. Id. Justice Thomas gave an example, stating that "we doubt it would be unconstitutional" if a
government employer sent a portion of a government employee's paycheck directly to a religious
organization designated by that employee. Id.
433. See id. at 809.

regard to religion, to all who adequately further that purpose, then it
is fair to say that any aid going to a religious recipient only has the
effect of furthering that secular purpose.'
Although the plurality does not take it this far, based on its rationale of
neutrality, it is difficult to see the distinction between government aid in the
form of physical objects (i.e., computers, slide projectors, etc.) and aid in the
form of money. 3 ' Accordingly, the Cleveland Program is likely to have at
least four supporters.
Justice O'Connor's analysis will likely be the key. She patently refused
to go along with the plurality's broad conception of neutrality.436 Although
Justice O'Connor did appear to completely rule out the constitutionality of
direct subsidies,437 her distinction between per-capita-aid and true private
choice programs gives hope to the Cleveland Program. 38' Justice O'Connor
clearly appears to favor a true private choice program in general, especially
when it comes to her concerns about endorsement and direct monetary
subsidies.3 9 For example, Justice O'Connor's principle of distinction for
purposes of "endorsement" sounds very similar to the rationale of the
plurality:
In terms of public perception, a government program of direct aid to
religious schools based on the number of students attending each
school differs meaningfully from the government distributing aid
directly to individual students who, in turn, decide to use the aid at
the same religious schools. In the former example, if the religious
school uses the aid to inculcate religion in its students, it is
reasonable to say that the government has communicated a message
of endorsement. Because the religious indoctrination is supported
by government assistance, the reasonable observer would naturally
perceive the aid program as government support for the
advancement of religion. That the amount of aid received by the
school is based on the school's enrollment does not separate the
434. Id. at 809-10 (citation omitted).
435. Justice O'Connor actually points out this fact in Mitchell when she warns,
To be sure, the plurality does not actually hold that its theory extends to direct money
payments. That omission, however, is of little comfort. In its logic-as well as its specific
advisory language-the plurality opinion foreshadows the approval of direct monetary
subsidies to religious organizations, even when they use the money to advance their
religious objectives.
Id. at 844 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
436. See id. at 837-40.
437. Id. at 840.
438. Id. at 842; see also McConnell, supra note 21, at 696-97 (noting that based upon this
conception of true private-choice programs, "Justices O'Connor and Breyer will likely vote to
sustain" the constitutionality of the Cleveland Program).
439. See Mitchell, 520 U.S. at 842-44 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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government from the endorsement of the religious message. The
aid formula does not-and could not-indicate to a reasonable
observer that the inculcation of religion is endorsed only by the
individuals attending the religious school, who each affirmatively
choose to direct the secular government aid to the school and its
religious mission. No such choices have been made. In contrast,
when government aid supports a school's religious mission only
because of independent decisions made by numerous individuals to
guide their secular aid to that school, "[n]o reasonable observer is
likely to draw from the facts... an inference that the State itself is
endorsing a religious practice or belief." Rather, endorsement of
the religious message is reasonably attributed to the individuals who
select the path of the aid.44 °
Based on the above rationale, there should be little difference between aid in
the form of school supplies and school tuition.
However, Justice
O'Connor's treatment of the plurality's neutrality logic, as a cautionary and
"unprecedented" step forward in Establishment Clause jurisprudence,
evidences her hesitancy to abandon such a distinction and sign off fully on
the principle of private choice."2
Justice O'Connor's primary difficulty with the Cleveland Program may
arise under her Agostini analysis. In Mitchell, Justice O'Connor found it
critical that Chapter 2 funds merely "supplement the funds otherwise
available to a religious school. 4 3 In addition, an important factor for Justice
O'Connor was that "no Chapter 2 funds ever reach the coffers of a religious
school."" 4 These factors reflect Justice O'Connor's disagreement with the
plurality's conclusion "that actual diversion of government aid to religious
indoctrination is consistent with the Establishment Clause.""' 5 Because of
the absolutist nature of Justice O'Connor's concerns, if the above factors

440. Id. at 842-43 (citations omitted) (quoting Witters v. Wash. Dep't. Serv. For The Blind, 474
U.S. 481, 493 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment)). Compare
Justice Thomas' comment on the rationale of the Court in Zobrest: "private choices helped to ensure
neutrality, and neutrality and private choices together eliminated any possible attribution to the
government even when the interpreter translated classes on Catholic doctrine." Id. at 811.
441. Id. at 837.
442. Justice O'Connor explained, "the most important reason for according special treatment to
direct money grants is that this form of aid falls precariously close to the original object of the
Establishment Clause's prohibition." Id. at 856.
443. Id. at 848. Justice O'Connor flatly declared that "Chapter 2 funds must in no case be used to
supplant funds from non-Federal sources." Id.
444. Id.
445. Id. at 840.

play heavily into Justice O'Connor's analysis of the Cleveland Program, her
vote may be difficult to reach.
However, Justice O'Connor's analysis of the Cleveland Program may
not be limited to a simple Agostini-type analysis. The facts are simply
different."' Accordingly, she may decide as she did in Mitchell because of
her disagreement with the plurality's approach, to focus her analysis on
precedent like Nyquist, a case more factually analogous to the issue at
hand.447 In evaluating the Cleveland Program, both the district court and the
Sixth Circuit determined that Nyquist governed their result.44 For example,
the Sixth Circuit found that "the program at hand is a tuition grant program
for low-income parents whose children attend private school [and is
factually] parallel to the tuition reimbursement program found impermissible
'
in Nyquist. 449
However, both lower courts raised concerns as to whether
Nyquist was applicable to the Cleveland Program, and even more
fundamentally, whether Nyquist was still good law.45°
Taking the second question first, Nyquist may have been implicitly
overruled by the Court's recent precedent. In Mitchell, the Court determined
that two decisions decided prior to its more recent precedent, Meek and
Woolman, were no longer consistent with the Court's analysis of the
Establishment Clause because the Court had "'departed from the rule...
that all government aid that directly assists the educational function of
religious schools is invalid."' 45
Justice Thomas explained that the
indirect/direct aid distinction was now governed by the "principle of private

446. In Mitchell, Justice O'Connor acknowledged that in school aid cases "'judgment requires
courts to draw lines, sometimes quite fine, based on the particular facts of each case."' Id. at 844
(quoting Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 847 (1995) (O'Connor,
J., concurring)).
447. In Mitchell, Justice O'Connor noted that "Agostini ... concerned an Establishment Clause
challenge to a school-aid program closely related to the one at issue here." Id. at 844.
448. Simmons-Harris v. Zelman, 234 F.3d 945, 958 (6th Cir. 2000) ("Factually, the program at
hand is a tuition grant program for low-income parents whose children attend private school parallel
to the tuition reimbursement program found impermissible in Nyquist."); Simmons-Harris v.
Zelman, 72 F. Supp. 2d 834, 850 ("Since the court finds that Nyquist is directly relevant precedent, it
is 'constrained to follow it' . . . . [I]t is not within the power of this court to decide that a case
decided by the Supreme Court should be overruled.").
449. Simmons-Harris v. Zelman, 234 F.3d at 958. Cf. Simmons-Harris v. Zelman, 72 F. Supp. 2d
at 849 ("[Tlhe fact that the Voucher Program overwhelmingly benefits sectarian schools and that the
grants provided under the Program are not restricted to supporting only secular functions of a
participating school's educational program make it indistinguishable for Establishment Clause
purposes from the tuition reimbursement program in Nyquist.").
450. Writing for the majority in the Sixth Circuit, Judge Clay found that "[t[he Supreme Court has
refrained from overruling Nyquist, and has instead distinguished various cases on the basis of their
facts .... " Simmons-Harris v. Zelman, 234 F.3d at 955. In sharp contrast, however, Judge Ryan in
dissent argued that "[t]he substantial differences in the purpose and application of the two statutes is
not the only reason Nyquist does not govern our result. The additional reason is that the rule of law
upon which Nyquist was decided has changed." Id. at 965 (Ryan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in
part).
451. Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 816 (quoting Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 225 (1997)).
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choice. 4 2 Similar reasoning can be applied to the situation of direct money
subsidies.5 3 Although Nyquist has not explicitly been overruled, the Court's
tone and method of analysis seems to have shifted since 1973 when it stated
in Nyquist that "direct aid in whatever form is invalid." '4
In addition, the New York statute at issue in Nyquist may be
distinguishable from the Cleveland statute. 5 For example, the program
struck down in Nyquist provided for direct money subsidies for maintenance
and repair of school facilities, which were allocated on a per-capita basis,

but were only available to New York's private schools in low-income
areas.w In contrast, the Cleveland Program provided indirect money
subsidies (i.e., vouchers), which were allocated based on need, to students

attending public schools.'

Perhaps even more simply, an argument can be

made that Nyquist did not address the situation of a true private choice
program like that in Cleveland.4 8 The Court in Nyquist noted that "we need

not decide whether the significantly religious character of the statute's
beneficiaries might differentiate the present cases from a case involving
some form of public assistance (e.g., scholarships) made available generally
without regard to the sectarian-nonsectarian,
or public-nonpublic nature of
45'
the institution benefitted. 1
Lower courts clearly are unsure how to apply the current Supreme Court

precedent to the school voucher issue. The Cleveland Voucher Program is

452. Id. at 816.
453. See, e.g., Simmons-Harris v. Zelman, 234 F.3d at 965 (Ryan, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part) ("First, the Nyquist era categorical prohibition against direct grants to aid religious
schools is no longer the law; and second, the criteria for determining when a statute has the
forbidden 'primary effect' of advancing religion have been modified.").
454. Comm. for Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 780 (1973). The
Court in Nyquist also found that "the fact that aid is disbursed to parents rather than to the schools is
only one among many factors to be considered." Id. at 781. Compare Justice Thomas' statement in
Mitchell: "If aid to schools, even 'direct aid,' is neutrally available and, before reaching or
benefitting any religious school, first passes through the hands (literally or figuratively) of numerous
private citizens who are free to direct the aid elsewhere, the government has not provided any
,support of religion."' Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 816 (quoting Witters v. Wash. Dept. of Services for the
Blind, 474 U.S. 481,489 (1986)).
455. See, e.g., Simmons-Harris v. Zelman, 234 F.3d at 964 (Ryan, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part) (finding Nyquist "simply inapposite" to the present appeal).
456. Id. at 964-65 ("The Ohio voucher program... could not be more unlike the New York
statute both in its purpose and in the manner of its application.").
457. Id. ("A case construing a statute so manifestly different than the one before us could hardly,
as afactual matter, be a binding precedent on this court.").
458. See, e.g., Jackson v. Benson, 578 N.W.2d 602, 614 (Wis. 1998) (finding that Nyquist
"specifically reserved the issue whether an educational assistance program that was both neutral and
indirect would survive an Establishment Clause challenge.").
459. Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 782 n.38.
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just the type of program the Court refused to put its definitive stamp on in
Nyquist, and now, almost 30 years later, the Court has that chance.
VI. CONCLUSION

The Cleveland Voucher Program is constitutional under the Court's
current Establishment Clause jurisprudence. History evidences that strict or
absolute separation between church and state was not the intent, nor the goal
of the framers of the First Amendment. The Supreme Court's Establishment
Clause jurisprudence, after a slow start, is finally beginning to recognize this
fact. Vouchers can provide a reasonable and hopeful educational alternative
for those children who need it the most. The bottom line is that government
is playing a passive role here, allowing parents and children to choose their
school. The money is not subsidizing the schools, but the parents and child.
Without such opportunities, many children in the inner-cities face the type of
segregated, unequal future that surely the founders would find more
objectionable than the possibility that while they learn the "three R's" they
might choose to let God in on the process.
Tyler Neal4"

460. Pepperdine University School of Law, Class of 2002.

400

